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## Summary for Policymakers



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# FOREWORD

As we set off for Cancún in Mexico, venue for the 16th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC and 6th Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, the Francophonie will, as has become customary, make its contribution to helping and supporting the negotiators through the guide now in your possession.

The outcome of the Copenhagen Conference was ambivalent, in line with expectations. Nevertheless, it:

- reaffirmed the political willingness of all countries to address climate change under the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities;
- highlighted the need to encourage preparing and executing projects on adaptation/mitigation, technology transfer and emission reductions by addressing deforestation and degradation of forests;
- made available new and additional financing to implement projects from vulnerable developing/least developed countries for fast-start actions.

The international community currently recognizes these decision elements as key in incorporating climate change into sustainable development policies. They should trigger action, a fundamental move today in terms of impact sought and the joint objective of sustainable development and fewer greenhouse gas emissions.

As you will find, the outcome of these climate negotiations will still depend on economic, political and geostrategic interests being discussed by the Annex I Parties, which are still expected in the greenhouse gas reduction rates. Time is of the essence in protecting OUR PLANET, achieved by boosting the introduction and execution of low-carbon sectoral policies and green economy action programmes in the non-Annex I countries, to ensure the sustainability of their respective development.

The time has come for concrete action alongside negotiations. The country Parties agree globally to give themselves the technical and financial resources to move in this direction. The Cancún Conference will undoubtedly mark a decisive step in moving into action and the negotiations will continue...

Fatimata DIA Touré  
Director, IEPF

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# 1. INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

At the end of Copenhagen in 2009, the gap between the outcome of the negotiation session and the expectations of this summit was disappointing. For those hoping for consensus on a global agreement in 2009 after four years of negotiations on a post-2012 climate change regime, Copenhagen made little concrete progress. In this respect, although it now seems obvious that the Cancún Conference will not achieve the progress hoped for in Copenhagen, it will determine what headway the delegates could achieve in 2011. Will they agree on the path to follow towards an ambitious agreement for the post-2012 period?

As the Copenhagen Summit did not reach a legally-binding agreement on a post-2012 climate change regime, the governmental representatives of some two hundred countries will meet in Cancún, from 29 November to 10 December 2010, under the auspices of the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (UNFCCC), to continue negotiation this agreement under the guidance of the new UNFCCC Secretary General, Christiana Figueres. The oft-repeated statement throughout 2010 that a legally-binding agreement is unlikely to be achieved in Cancún but could be in 2011 makes this meeting an important step between the 15th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (in Copenhagen) and the 17th Conference which will be held in South Africa in 2011.

## **Cancún: a critical step between Copenhagen and South Africa**

Having failed in their quest for a legally-binding agreement, the countries participating in the 2009 negotiations ended up with a high-level policy declaration: the Copenhagen Accord. The fruit of restricted negotiation, this Accord is the product of discussions firstly between some thirty countries and then between the United States and the four countries from the BASIC Group (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) (See Box 2). Despite the disappointment of failing to reach agreement in Copenhagen on the magnitude of medium-term mitigation commitments by developed countries, decisive for the involvement of emerging developing countries, the Accord is nevertheless noteworthy for the participation of two main greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters in the fight against climate change - China and the United States. In addition, developing countries were asked for the first time to volunteer information on national mitigation actions and developed countries set themselves financing objectives. The Parties focused on both these elements in 2010 in an attempt to reinstate a degree of trust between the countries and thus be able to move forward. In 2010, the legitimacy of the Copenhagen Accord was nevertheless discussed at length. Viewed by certain countries, including the United States, as a key political agreement which should provide a basis for negotiations on a post-2012 regime, other countries argued that the Accord had no legitimacy as it had not been confirmed by all the Parties and was not legally binding.

Concurrently, as negotiation sessions and side forums under the UNFCCC progressed, many countries repeated their desire to reach a legally-binding agreement on a post-2012 regime (See Sheet 3). Determining the legal nature may in fact be crucial in Cancún to allay the developing countries' scepticism about the good faith of developed countries over their promises of emission mitigation and the commitment by the United States to contribute to the global mitigation efforts. The disappointment caused by the United States declining to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the difficulty, if not impossibility, for certain developed countries which have ratified the Protocol to achieve their individual reduction targets by 2012 exerts tremendous pressure on guaranteeing the legally-binding nature of the future agreement given the controlling power and sanction implied by this type of agreement. Most developing countries and some developed countries have recently taken a stance in favour of adopting in Cancún a decision stating the legal nature of the future agreement, to clarify for all the Parties whether or not they will work in 2011 towards adopting a legally-binding agreement.

### **Cancún: witness to a new geopolitical reality?**

International political reality has changed since the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. In 1997, developed countries were the largest emitters and therefore principally responsible for the problem of climate change. Accounting for more than 60% of carbon dioxide emissions in 1997<sup>1</sup>, they therefore had to be the first to act to reduce their emissions. In 2005, over half the global GHG emissions came from countries not members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and seven of the fifteen largest emitting countries were countries not included in Annex I to the UNFCCC (considered to be developing countries)<sup>2</sup>. Another sign of change is that Mexico, South Korea, Israel, Chile and Slovenia have joined OECD and China has taken on the status of world economic power and the largest GHG emitter in absolute terms<sup>3</sup>.

The Copenhagen Accord crystallizes some of this by requesting the developing countries to indicate national mitigation actions for the first time. In addition, the pressure applied to emerging countries to adopt mitigation commitments has led to the formation of a new underlying negotiating force. The first meetings of the BASIC countries therefore seem to be triggering a change in the geopolitics of negotiations by providing an exchange forum for developing countries which are large emitters, in parallel to the Group of 77 and China (G-77/China), which groups all developing countries. In addition, the lack of emerging country support for certain positions

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1. According to calculations carried out in the database of the Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT), Version 7.0.
  2. According to the CAIT, Version 7.0, non-OECD member countries emitted 57.4% of global GHG emissions in 2005.
  3. According to calculations carried out in the CAIT database, Version 7.0.

taken by the least developed countries (LDCs) and by Small Island Developing States (SIDS) - such as limiting temperature rises to 1 or 1.5°C or differentiating between developing countries according to their vulnerability to climate change - has also caused divergences affecting G-77/China unity.

Another potential source of division between the countries is the form of the outcome of negotiations on a post-2012 climate regime. Neither the United States nor Japan are seeking a legally-binding agreement, rather pledges of transparent actions by emerging economies. The other developed countries, however, like the European Union, are stressing the legally-binding nature of an agreement which encompasses the large emitting countries, including the United States, in order to operationalize more stringent reduction targets than those announced so far. The developing countries are also emphasizing the legally-binding nature of developed country commitments, which would only be guaranteed by renewing the Kyoto Protocol. Thus, without the assurance of binding targets for all developed countries, including the United States, in a second commitment period under Kyoto or a similar agreement, it will be difficult to re-establish a level of trust which incites the emerging developing countries to take mitigation actions and account for them to the international community. The United States makes the transparency of mitigation actions by developing countries, especially the most advanced, a priority and a condition for their committing to any legally-binding agreement. In addition, it is uncertain whether granting the planned financing under the Copenhagen Accord and the provision of technological resources can provide sufficient incentive for developing countries to guarantee transparency, despite the LDCs counting heavily on this support to embark on mitigation and adaptation actions.

Given the number and complexity of issues to be resolved, Cancún will be a transition conference which will plot the path desired by several Parties towards adopting a legally-binding agreement, including a second commitment period under Kyoto. The challenge will be to set the necessary milestones for continued negotiations without prejudicing the final outcome. In Cancún, most therefore consider that progress will need to rely on a question of balance between concrete decisions to inspire trust and incentives to raise the ambition of global mitigation efforts.

## 2. BRIEF HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE

Since the adoption in 1992 of the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (UNFCCC) on the fringes of the Rio Declaration, the threat from global warming for human beings and ecosystems has gradually been included in the international agenda. In the belief that the commitments made in Rio under the UNFCCC to stabilise greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by the year 2000 fell short of the mark, the *3rd Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC* (COP) adopted the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. Under this Protocol, the Parties included in Annex I of the UNFCCC which have ratified the Protocol are obliged to reduce overall the emissions of six GHGs by 5.2% compared with 1990 levels by 2012.

Having postponed the adoption of decisions on how to achieve this reduction after signing the Protocol, the Parties continued with negotiations after 1997 on its controversial items. The Marrakesh Accords adopted in 2001 subsequently agreed to set up various ways and means of making the Kyoto Protocol operational. However, the Protocol was only ratified in 2005 and its implementation was delayed in a few countries. Australia only ratified it in December 2007, for example. The United States, the world's second largest GHG emitter<sup>4</sup>, has not ratified the Protocol and is therefore not subject to any obligation to reduce GHG emissions under it. Furthermore, certain Annex I countries which have ratified the Protocol will find it difficult, if not impossible, to comply with their individual reduction targets by 2012<sup>5</sup>. The GHG emissions of non-Annex I Parties - viewed as developing countries - have been rising constantly since 1990 (GHG emissions of these countries increased by 62.6% between 1990 and 2005<sup>6</sup>) and China is now the world's largest GHG emitter<sup>7</sup>.

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4. According to the 2005 data in CAIT, Version 7.0.

5. As a rough guide, GHG emissions (excluding the Land Use, Land Use changes and Forestry - LULUCF - sector) between 1990 and 2005 increased by 13.6% in Japan, 27% in Canada and 38.7% in Australia. According to the CAIT, Version 7 databases, Japan produced GHG emissions (excluding the LULUCF sector) of 1.193 megatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO<sub>2</sub>e) in 1990 and 1.356 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e in 2005; Canada produced 582 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e in 1990 and 739.3 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e in 2005; Australia produced 402 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e in 1990 and 559 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e in 2005.

6. According to the CAIT, Version 7.0 databases, the Parties not included in Annex I produced GHG emissions of 11,967 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e in 1990 and 19,459 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e in 2005.

7. According to the 2005 data in CAIT, Version 7.0.



With this in mind, it seems essential to adopt a long-term agreement which effectively supports genuine national mitigation actions if global GHG emissions are to be reduced practically and quickly in the medium and long term. For this purpose, the Bali Action Plan adopted in 2007 was designed to boost the post-2012 initiatives to address climate change by producing a two-year road map, with the goal of agreeing a post-2012 climate regime in Copenhagen (Box 1).

### **Box 1.**

#### **Bali Action Plan**

The Bali Action Plan set out the main themes covered by the current negotiations:

#### **1. THE SHARED VISION FOR LONG-TERM COOPERATIVE ACTION**

The plan is that the shared vision will revolve around a long-term global objective of reducing GHG emissions to achieve the ultimate Convention objective. This objective should take into account principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.

#### **2. THE FOUR CONSTITUENT COMPONENTS OF THE BALI ACTION PLAN**

**Mitigation:** The Parties have agreed to consider the following elements:

- appropriate mitigation commitments or actions, including quantified GHG emission limitation and reduction objectives by all developed countries; and
- appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties, supported and made possible by technologies, financing resources and capacity building.

**Adaptation:** This involves examining international cooperation in supporting miscellaneous adaptation actions, given the immediate needs of developing countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, mainly the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and the African countries.

**Technology development and transfer:** Effective mechanisms and increased resources to reduce obstacles and provide financial incentives will be envisaged to promote access by developing country Parties to environmentally sound technologies at affordable cost.

**Financing:** Financial support is necessary to mitigate GHG emissions and help developing countries to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. The granting modalities and scale of the financing have yet to be decided.

The Parties failed to reach a detailed agreement in Copenhagen, but they nevertheless agreed to advance the negotiations on a post-2012 regime by the COP-16 in Cancún. Testifying to the controversial preparation for the Copenhagen Accord (see Box 2), the result of COP-15 helped lessen expectations for the COP-16, which are now nowhere near as high as they might have been in Copenhagen.

## **Box 2.**

### **Copenhagen Accord**

The fruit of negotiation restricted to the "Friends of the Chair" countries during the night of 18-19 December 2009, the Accord states the political desire of States associated with the agreement to address climate change in accordance with the **principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities**. Although 139 governments<sup>8</sup> have signified their association with the Accord, it is not legally binding.

#### **MITIGATION**

The Accord is banking on an **objective of limiting the rise in global temperature to 2°C** and a cap on world emissions "as quickly as possible".

The Accord requires:

- **Annex I Parties:** submission to the Secretariat of quantified individual or joint emission reduction targets to be achieved by 2020. To date, 42<sup>9</sup> countries have submitted their targets.
- **non-Annex I Parties:** submission of mitigation actions to the Secretariat. The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) can however take voluntary actions. To date, 43<sup>10</sup> countries have submitted their mitigation actions.

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8. Including 41 member countries and associate member countries of the International Organization of La Francophonie.

9. Including 8 member countries and associate member countries of the International Organization of La Francophonie.

10. Including fourteen member countries and associate member countries of the International Organization of La Francophonie.

## FINANCING

The Accord requires **scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate financing as well as improved access.**

The Parties are targeting financing amounting to:

- **30 billion US dollars for the 2010-2012 period; and**
- **100 billion US dollars per year by 2020.**

In this respect, certain Annex I Parties have also promised financial support during 2010<sup>11</sup>, An Internet site has been set up to report the amounts pledged so that the commitments announced by these countries can be monitored<sup>12</sup>.

In support of these financing actions and objectives, the Accord provides for the creation of:

- a **high-level panel on financing** with the task of examining possible sources of financing to achieve the financing objectives; and
- the **Copenhagen Green Climate Fund**, an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention.

The Accord provides for **financial resources, technologies and capacity building** to support mitigation and adaptation actions, especially in the LDCs, SIDS and African countries which will receive financing for adaptation in priority.

It also creates a Technology Mechanism to accelerate technology development and transfer in support of action on adaptation and mitigation.

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11. To access a World Resources Institute analysis of promised commitments by Annex I Parties, see: [http://pdf.wri.org/climate\\_finance\\_pledges\\_2010-10-02.pdf](http://pdf.wri.org/climate_finance_pledges_2010-10-02.pdf).

12. See: <http://www.faststartfinance.org/content/contributing-countries>.

### **3. ISSUES OF THE CANCÚN CONFERENCE**

The greatest challenge facing the Cancún Conference will be to re-establish the trust between the Parties which was heavily undermined in Copenhagen, so that negotiations can continue constructively in 2011. It is the very role of the multilateral process which is in play in many people's eyes, as the Parties will decide in Cancún on the way forward towards an ambitious agreement for the post-2012 period. Will this mean concrete decisions on key negotiation issues? Or an overall political vision encompassing the process to reach an agreement later on?

Concrete decision on certain issues will convince those who have lost their trust that there is a willingness to re-establish it. But others feel that just any decision is not the answer, for there is a risk of prejudicing the final outcome of negotiations in Cancún and the objective of reaching a legally-binding agreement is therefore in danger. In Cancún, everything will therefore hang on balancing various concrete decisions to inspire trust, especially on questions of financing and transparency of country mitigation actions, whilst avoiding prejudicing the final outcome of negotiations on a post-2012 regime.

The Cancún Conference agenda includes issues relating to GHG emission mitigation, adaptation, financial and technological support and capacity building. This section analyzes these themes to identify stumbling blocks in each of the issues and highlight the geopolitical dynamics which are a feature of climate diplomacy.

#### **1. Mitigation of GHG emissions**

The Bali Action Plan provides for the Parties to agree on a shared vision, ultimately intended to reach a long-term objective of reducing GHG emissions. Agreement on the shared vision would be a boost to the Parties in determining mitigation efforts by developed and developing countries by 2010. The lack of consensus on the binding or declaratory nature of the framework governing the shared vision and on its associated emission reduction objective is holding back the negotiations on the medium-term objectives expected to follow on from the current Kyoto targets.

At the same time as the discussions on the shared vision, the developed countries have the mandate to agree on quantified GHG emission reduction commitments for the post-2012 period. The plan is for these commitments to take over from the current commitments of developed countries under the Kyoto Protocol, either in the context of a legally-binding agreement under the Convention or in the context of a second commitment period under the Protocol. Linked to this question of the scale of reduction targets is the distinction made between the developed and developing countries under the UNFCCC; this is a central point for discussion. Since the adoption of the Bali Action Plan, which provides for implementation of mitigation actions

at different scales for all the countries, the developed countries have raised doubts over this categorization in the negotiations to determine the nature and scale of mitigation actions to be taken by each group of countries. The developed countries want the most advanced developing countries to commit to implementing quantified mitigation actions and report on them to the international community.

## **Mitigation in developed countries and adoption of GHG emission reduction targets**

Disappointed by insufficient GHG emission reductions by the developed countries for the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, the developing countries have expressed their distrust of reduction commitment promises by developed countries since the beginning of negotiations for the post-2012 period. The current lack of binding obligations for the United States and the strong likelihood that certain countries will not meet their reduction commitments by 2012 is encouraging the developing countries to request the developed countries to make ambitious, binding commitments by agreeing to a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol.

In the long term, many developed countries and certain emerging countries, such as China, are calling for a global limitation in the rise in temperature of 2°C. In the medium term, the developing countries see the developed countries acting as lead partners, by committing to 40% reduction in their GHG emissions by 2020 compared with 1990. Many developed countries, including the European Union countries, for example, are making ambitious medium-term commitments conditional on mitigation efforts by the most advanced developing countries and the United States<sup>13</sup>.

Many developed countries have thus indicated individual emission reduction targets for 2010 (see Table 1), thereby favouring a bottom-up approach. The developed country targets put forward so far are nowhere near the 40% stipulated by the developing countries (they represent a reduction of 17% to 25% by 2020 over 1990<sup>14</sup>). The developing countries would therefore prefer a top-down approach, fixing a global objective and distributing it between the developed countries based on such criteria as Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Having said that, the most advanced developing countries are refusing to take the binding mitigation actions sought by the developed countries. The developed countries in fact want to make sure that these actions reduce GHG emissions in large emitting developing countries to below the business-as-usual emission levels. There is deadlock, therefore, over mitigation: no one country dares take the initiative by proposing more binding and ambitious objectives than the ones already on the table.

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13. FCCC/KP/AWG/2009/MISC.15.

14. FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/INF.2/Rev.1, p.11.

In addition, before any consideration of reduction targets, the developed countries wish to see a solution for the rules governing the flexibility mechanisms and accounting mechanisms for emissions from the Land Use, Land Use changes and Forestry (LULUCF) sector. This negotiating issue is crucial given the potential impact of emissions from LULUCF activities and emission reductions through flexibility mechanisms on the level of effort the reduction objectives represent for the developed countries.

**TABLE 1.**  
**QUANTIFIED COMMITMENT PLEDGES BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES<sup>15</sup>**

Developed countries	Proposed national targets (% of GHG emission reductions)	Reference year	Target year
Australia	25% if an ambitious global agreement emerges from the negotiations to stabilize GHG levels at 450 ppm or less (which is equivalent to 24% below 1990 levels). Unconditional 5% reduction.	2000	2020
Belarus	5 to 10%	1990	2020
Canada	17%	2005	2020
Croatia	5%	1990	2020
European Union and its member States	20% to 30% on condition that developed and the most advanced developing countries commit to suitable mitigation actions to limit the temperature rise to 2 °C.	1990	2020
Iceland	15% to 30% depending on the renewal of the current rules of the LULUCF sector.	1990	2020

15. FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/INF.2/Rev.1.

**TABLE 1. (suite)**  
**QUANTIFIED COMMITMENT PLEDGES BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES**

Developed countries	Proposed national targets (% of GHG emission reductions)	Reference year	Target year
Japan	25%	1990	2020
Kazakhstan	15%		
Liechtenstein	20% to 30% on condition that developed and the most advanced developing countries commit to suitable mitigation actions.		
Monaco	30%	1990	2020
Norway	30% to 40% (scale of the target depends on the willingness of large emitting countries to agree on emission reduction ranges complying with the 2oC limitation objective). Carbon neutral in 2050.	1990	2020
New Zealand	10% to 20% (scale of the target will depend on the commitments made by the developed countries, efforts by the most advanced developing countries based on their capacities, an effective regime for the LULUCF sector, recourse to a carbon market and the adoption of a global agreement to limit the temperature rise to 2°C).	1990	2020
Russia	15% to 25%	1990	2020
Switzerland	20% to 30% provided that the other developed countries make similar commitments and that the most advanced developing countries contribute to the mitigation effort according to their respective responsibilities and capacities.	1990	2020
Ukraine	20%	1990	2020

Many countries are keen on the idea of incorporating the objectives, or commitments, of developed countries, including those not obligated under the Kyoto Protocol, in a COP decision in Cancún. Such a decision would have the effect of formalizing the objectives or commitments of developed countries, most of whom are currently associated with the Copenhagen Accord. Certain countries also seek to include the objectives or commitments of the most advanced developing countries, an idea opposed strongly by the emerging economies.

## **Mitigation in developing countries**

Possible contributions by developing countries to mitigating GHG emissions in the shape of nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) have been debated fiercely since the adoption of the Bali Action Plan in 2007.

The issues on this topic mainly focus on the nature of these NAMAs and the scale of developing country responsibility in terms of their implementation and the effective, verifiable reduction of the GHG emissions they achieve. The developed countries, which intend to support part of these actions, wish to monitor how their funds are used and make access to them conditional on achieving quantified GHG emission reductions. For this purpose, they therefore wish all NAMAs to comply with the international criteria for actions taken in a measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV) manner. Developing countries wish a distinction to be made between supported NAMAs and those not receiving financial support; they therefore prefer the international MRV provisions to apply to supported NAMAs only and that unsupported NAMAs be subject to more flexible national MRV provisions, if necessary.

Note that under NAMAs notified by virtue of the Copenhagen Accord, several emerging developing countries have indicated expected GHG emission reduction levels for 2020 (Table 2). It is however difficult to compare the anticipated emission reductions between the countries as they all use different metrics.



**TABLE 2.**  
**ANTICIPATED EMISSION REDUCTIONS BY LARGE EMITTING DEVELOPING**  
**COUNTRIES UNDER NAMAS<sup>16</sup>**

Country	Anticipated emission reductions (%)	Reference	Target year
South Africa	GHG emissions reduced by 34% provided financial and technological support received from developed countries	Business as usual	2020
Brazil	GHG emissions reduced by between 36.1% to 38.9%	Business as usual	2020
China	Carbon dioxide emissions reduced by 40% to 45% per unit of GDP	2005	2020
South Korea	GHG emissions reduced by 30%	Business as usual	2020
India	20% to 25% reduction in intensity of emissions of its GDP	2005	2020
Indonesia	26% reduction	-	2020
Mexico	GHG emissions reduced by 30% provided financial and technological support received from developed countries	Business as usual	2020

16. Submissions dated 25 to 30 January 2010, see: <http://unfccc.int/home/items/5265.php>.

Mechanisms other than NAMAs exist to mitigate emissions in developing countries, like the clean development mechanism (CDM) and a mechanism to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation of forests (REDD), are envisaged. Table 3 summarizes the key negotiating questions on these mechanisms.

**TABLE 3.**  
**LES PRINCIPAUX ENJEUX RELATIFS AUX MÉCANISMES D’ATTÉNUATION**  
**DANS LES PAYS EN DÉVELOPPEMENT**

<p>Reductions of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD)</p>	<p>What activities will be permitted under REDD?</p> <p>Should an objective for REDD actions be set or should they be based on a voluntary approach? Should they respond to a results-orientated approach?</p> <p>Should reference emission levels and national and sub-national reference levels be established?</p> <p>Should REDD actions be considered as NAMAs?</p> <p>What is the preferred mechanism for the financing: a fund (either a unique REDD fund or a wider fund with a REDD section) or a market or compensation mechanism or a gradual, combined approach?</p>
<p>Reform of market mechanisms</p>	<p>Should a limit be imposed on recourse to units from flexibility mechanisms, to comply with emission reduction objectives? Which bases should be used to define this limit (e.g. as a percentage of emission reductions achieved; on an individual or collective basis)?</p> <p>Should the scope of applicability of flexibility mechanisms be widening by allowing new activities?</p> <p>How can demonstrating the additionality of CDM projects be improved?</p> <p>Which mechanisms could encourage the implementation of specific projects (e.g. discount factors for the number of CER granted, obligation to use CER generated by projects in host countries with less than ten projects or in LDCs or African countries)?</p> <p>Should new flexibility mechanisms (e.g. accreditation mechanism for economic segments or based on developing country NAMAs) be created?</p>

## **Taking impacts from response measures into account**

Linked as they are with the question of emission reductions, the impacts from response measures are a major issue which is slowing down the negotiations on mitigation. A large number of developing countries fear they may suffer from the negative consequences of response measures to climate change implemented by developed countries. As a rough guide, countries with economies principally based on fossil fuel exports fear that the mitigation actions implemented in the developed countries urging a reduction in fossil energy consumption will have a negative impact on their economies. Faced with this fear, developing countries wish developed countries to minimize the potential effects of response measures and seek the creation of a forum to assess the economic and social consequences of response measures. The idea of this forum is supported by the developing countries, but the developed countries do not favour this option, preferring discussions to take place via the national communications, to limit any evaluation of their national policies.

The success of the Cancún Conference depends greatly on achieving a balance between firstly, the ambition of mitigation commitments of developed countries and NAMA transparency in developing countries and secondly, financial support living up to the expectations of developing countries for both mitigation and adaptation to climate change.

## **2. Adapting to climate change**

Adaptation is critical, given the challenges of climate change in meeting objectives of sustainable development and combating poverty in developing countries. The Bali Action Plan recognizes the need to enhance action for adaptation mainly through increased financial resources, investments and technologies designed to support adaptation.

The issues surrounding adaptation focus mainly on the possible components of an institutional "framework" or global adaptation "programme" and more especially the fundamental principles of adaptation underlying this framework. Among these principles, recognizing the special vulnerability of certain developing countries raises several stumbling blocks, mainly related to financing.

## **Differentiating between developing countries**

Given the limited resources, it has been suggested that the global "framework" for adaptation in a post-2012 regime gives priority to the needs of particularly vulnerable developing countries, including the least developed countries (LDCs), the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and the African countries affected by floods, drought

and desertification. This suggestion implies categorizing developing countries based on vulnerability and developing countries are far from reaching consensus on this point. The categorization question is crucial as it is linked directly to access to financial and technological support. Any differentiation made between developing countries for adaptation means in all probability that they receive different levels of financial and technological support. For example, the LDCs Group is proposing that 70% of the financing for adaptation be allocated to the LDCs, the SIDS and the particularly vulnerable African countries<sup>17</sup>.

### **Adaptation action implementation and communication means**

The means of implementing adaptation actions are a major stumbling block, especially in terms of financing adaptation. Whereas developed countries wish the question of support to be addressed in the far broader context of financing discussions, the developing countries seek the assurance that a share of the financing is set aside exclusively for adaptation. The African Group suggests, for example, that developed countries pay 1.5% of their GDP per year into an Adaptation Fund<sup>18</sup>.

Another major disagreement is over knowing what means will be used to communicate information on adaptation actions implemented and the nature of this information. On this topic, developing countries want only the implementation of support commitments by developed countries to be communicated, not the setting up of the adaptation actions themselves. On the other hand, the developed countries require a report on the use of funds which is then to be examined.

### **Institutional framework**

The question of institutional systems having to govern the global adaptation "framework" and the functions of such systems was at the centre of negotiations on adaptation during 2010. The idea of creating an adaptation framework or an adaptation implementation framework through which the Parties would undertake planning, assessment and institution enhancement activities seems to reach consensus among the Parties. Nevertheless, Parties diverge in their views as to whether it is preferable to reinforce the existing institutions or create new ones like an Adaptation Committee. Developed countries, for their part, have expressed their wish to count on the existing institutions, reforming them nevertheless, to support more effectively the implementation of the adaptation framework.

There is also disagreement over the functions of a potential Adaptation Committee; the developing countries would like the main role of this committee to be the

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17. IISD, 2010d, p.2.

18. IISD, 2010d, p.2.

provision of technical support to developing countries and support for access to financing for adaptation projects. Developed countries would see the functions of an adaptation institution as technical, for example for risk assessment, rather than to facilitate access to financing. Linked to the institutional question is the major disagreement over the creation of a specific mechanism to deal with losses and damage sought by developing countries; developed countries prefer to boost international cooperation and expertise in this area rather than create new institutions.

Despite a few differences, discussions on creating the Adaptation Committee seem fairly well advanced and it may be possible to agree on creating such a committee in Cancún and specifying its modalities in 2011.

### **3. Financial and technological support and capacity building**

The question of financial and technological support has gained more importance under negotiations on a post-2012 regime. In this respect, the Bali Action Plan links the mitigation and adaptation actions of developing countries to financial and technological support from developed countries. Several developing countries have also repeated their willingness to take mitigation actions subject to support from developed countries and capacity building. It is therefore essential for any agreement on a post-2012 regime to include a financial, technological and capacity building framework to support developing countries in their mitigation and adaptation efforts.

#### **Financing**

UThe sources of financing to be mobilized, the transparency and predictability of the financial support and the institutional arrangements have dominated the debates. Despite recognizing that there is a considerable gap between the adaptation and mitigation needs of developing countries and the financial resources currently available, the Parties are struggling to agree on how to generate this financing. Although the three funds established under the current regime are now in operation, the financing they have generated up to now (see Table 4) is far from meeting the estimated mitigation and adaptation needs, especially in the developing countries. As a rough guide, regarding mitigation, US\$200 to 210 billion will be necessary to achieve the 2005 GHG emission level<sup>19</sup>, including US\$75 billion set aside for developing countries<sup>20</sup>.

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19. UNFCCC, 2007 and its update FCCC/TP/2008/7.

20. Tirpak, D. and J-E. Parry, 2009.

**TABLE 4 :**  
**FUNDS GENERATED AND DISBURSED BY FINANCING MECHANISMS**  
**FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES**

Fund <sup>20</sup>	Budget (US\$ million)	Fonds déboursés (millions \$US)
LDC Fund <sup>21</sup>	221.45 <sup>i</sup> (total commitments) 169.19 <sup>i</sup> (total contributions paid)	141,92 <sup>ii</sup> (corresponds to approved projects, not necessarily disbursed)
Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) <sup>22</sup>	147.77 <sup>i</sup> (total commitments) 110.48 <sup>i</sup> (total contributions paid)	97,14 <sup>ii</sup> (corresponds to approved projects, not necessarily disbursed)
Adaptation Fund <sup>23</sup>	156.28 <sup>24</sup> (net available resources to finance adaptation projects, as at 31 July 2010) 372 (mean estimate of funds available until 2012) 8.62 million CER <sup>ii</sup>	14 <sup>iii</sup> (corresponds to approved projects, not necessarily disbursed)

i As at 31 May 2010.

ii As at 10 September 2010.

iii As at 20 September 2010.

Developing countries have generally defended the idea that the financing could come mainly from public sources due to their predictability, whereas developed countries have emphasized the inability of the public sector to generate all the financing required and the importance of the private sector. In terms of sources of public financing, the proposal to require contributions, at different scales, from all countries, including developing countries except the LDCs, is not unanimous within the developing countries. Developing countries are also emphasizing the improved accessibility and the additionality of the financing over development aid grants to avoid

21. Global Environment Facility, 2010; GEF Project List. See: <http://gefonline.org/>.

22. *Ibid.*

23. UNFCCC website, "The share of proceeds from the clean development mechanism project activities for the Adaptation Fund": <http://cdm.unfccc.int/Issuance/SOPBy-ProjectsTable.html>; World Bank (2010).

24. CER sales had generated since their monetisation in May 2009 a total of US\$112.5 million (as at 31 July 2010) (World Bank, 2010).

removing part of the financing set aside to reduce poverty, for example. In terms of allocation of resources, some are pressing for priority to be given to the most vulnerable countries as recipients of financing, including the SIDS, LDCs and African countries, whereas other countries reject any categorization of developing countries.

Several developing countries have also wished to fix financial objectives, based on the GDP or the Gross National Product (GNP) of developed countries. Developed countries are opposed to the proposals to set up a compliance regime for financial obligations, but they have however put forward financing objectives under the Copenhagen Accord (see Box 2). In October 2010, developed countries had promised 28 billion US dollars for fast-start financing from 2010 to 2012<sup>25</sup>. Many countries are thus calling for the inclusion of the fast-start financing provisions of the Copenhagen Accord (a grant of 30 billion US dollars during the 2010-2012 period) in the future agreement. The developing countries would like to set up a new process to ensure the transparency of the financial support. This would ensure the granting of predictable financing. Developed countries, however, prefer the use of national communications, in which case guidelines should be prepared to establish a common reporting format for the financial support.

Despite Parties agreeing on the need for effective mechanisms, the institutional arrangements and governance of the financing are still key negotiation issues. Divergences emerged in 2010 over whether the discussions should focus in priority on the proposed functions of financial institutions or on creating new institutions, the aim being to decide whether the existing institutions can fulfil the functions proposed or whether new institutions are necessary. Developing countries prefer institutions created under the auspices of the UNFCCC given their overall disillusionment with the Global Environment Facility (GEF). Several developed and developing countries have also requested the creation of a new Fund, with the United States calling for the creation of the Green Fund in Copenhagen.

The debates above all cover the roles of the fund's executive management entity. Most developing countries call for a finance commission or committee to be created to manage the fund. It would also monitor the transparency of the financial support and the granting of the financing for different themes. Most developed countries, including the United States, take the view rather that the management of new financial mechanisms should be based more on the existing institutions like the GEF. Governance of the financial framework is also of the utmost importance as each Party wants to make sure it is represented in the structures which will be agreed, especially the potential fund management committee.

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25. To access a World Resources Institute analysis of promised commitments by Annex I Parties, see: [http://pdf.wri.org/climate\\_finance\\_pledges\\_2010-10-02.pdf](http://pdf.wri.org/climate_finance_pledges_2010-10-02.pdf). An Internet site has been set up to report the amounts pledged so that the commitments announced by these countries can be monitored: <http://www.faststartfinance.org/content/contributing-countries>.

Many Parties consider that a decision on creating a Fund must be made in Cancún with the adoption of a precise timetable for setting it up; many developing countries are pressing for the creation of a finance committee through this decision.

## **Technology development and transfer**

The relevance of this question comes mainly from the tremendous technological challenge posed by the need to reduce GHG emissions in developed countries and the importance of technology transfers to encourage the implementation of mitigation and adaptation actions in developing countries. This issue raises a major stumbling block over intellectual property rights.

The developing countries view intellectual property rights as an obstacle to technology transfer. They have therefore requested a dispensation from intellectual property rights for technologies with low GHG emissions and suggested other measures, like voluntary licences, pooling patents and creating a world reserve of intellectual property rights for climate change technologies. Nevertheless, the majority of developed countries oppose any modification to the current regime for intellectual property rights, in the belief that their protection is fundamental in promoting the development of new technologies.

Regarding the institutional framework, consensus seems to be emerging on 2010 over creating a technologies mechanism including a Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and a Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), despite the developed countries preference for using existing institutions. The Parties will have to agree on the respective functions and status of any mechanisms created. Whereas the developing countries recommend full autonomy for the TEC and a broad role of technical support, intellectual property rights management, recommendation on the financial arrangements and supervision of granting technological support, the developed countries favour more restricted autonomy and an advisory role on adaptation and mitigation needs.

## **Capacity building**

Capacity building in developing countries is a cross-cutting theme in the Bali Action Plan dealing with mitigation, adaptation and financing. Underlining the inadequacy of the current arrangements, developing countries support the creation of a technical committee to ensure the granting of specific financing for capacity building. Developed countries, however, are against creating new institutions and favour using national communications to assess the support provided. There is further disagreement, this time over whether Annex I Parties with economies in transition should be able to benefit from technical assistance in capacity building in the same way as the developing countries.



## 4. EXPECTATIONS OF THE CANCÚN CONFERENCE

Although it now seems obvious that the Cancún negotiations will not achieve the agreement hoped for in Copenhagen on a post-2012 regime, it goes without saying that certain outcome is expected of the Cancún Conference. Hardened realists want the decisions made in Cancún to represent a balance in several respects: a balanced content between the various decisions adopted in the working groups and a balanced form to avoid prejudicing the final outcome. Many Parties are nevertheless united on the objective of reaching a legally-binding agreement in the near future.

This objective has been repeated several times in 2010 during forums such as the meetings of the BASIC countries<sup>26</sup> and the G8 Summit<sup>27</sup>. Tied closely to compliance with committed actions and fixed objectives for mitigation and financing, the scope of the legally-binding nature will be decisive for future guidance in the multilateral climate change process. Will this legally-binding nature apply to mitigation actions by the developing countries? To the reduction goals of developed countries? To the pledges of financial and technological support by developed countries?

A legally-binding agreement is reached in a variety of ways depending on the country. Most developing countries feel that the guarantee of a renewed Kyoto Protocol and the commitment of the United States in any global mitigation effort will prove the willingness of developed countries to work towards a legally-binding agreement. The developed countries believe that the balance sought is achievable more through a broad agreement ensuring a symmetry of restrictions between their mitigation objectives and actions by the most advanced developing countries, especially in terms of compliance with recommendations for actions taken in a measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV) manner.

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26. *Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of the Second Meeting of Ministers of BASIC Group, New Delhi, January, 24th, 2010*, see: <http://moef.nic.in/downloads/public-information/JointStatement.pdf>; *Third Meeting of BASIC Group Issues Joint Statement*, see: <http://climate-l.org/news/third-meeting-of-basic-group-issues-joint-statement/>; et *Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of the Fourth Meeting of Ministers of the BASIC Group, July 26, 2010*, see: <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/joint-statement-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-fourth-meeting-of-ministers-of-the-basic-group-rio-de-janeiro-25-26-july-2010>.

27. *G8 Muskoka Declaration Recovery and New Beginnings, Muskoka (Canada) 25-26 June 2010*, see: <http://g8.gc.ca/g8-summit/summit-documents/g8-muskoka-declaration-recovery-and-new-beginnings/>

In Cancún, the countries should balance these two approaches to inspire a feeling of mutual trust as they continue the negotiations in a constructive manner in 2011. In addition, as agreement on support for financing, adaptation, technologies and capacity building is a prerequisite for a global agreement on a post-2012 regime, any progress in these aspects will be key in pursuing the process. In the eyes of several countries, this progress should not however reduce the pressure for ambitious commitments by developed countries nor prejudice the form of the final outcome of the negotiations. The complexity of the task will therefore lie in finding consensus on decisions on policy elements, without prejudicing the form of the outcome of work by the two working groups of the Convention and the Protocol. After Tianjin, the themes targeted for such decisions seemed to be the long-term objective, creating a Fund, creating a registry for national mitigation actions in developing countries (NAMAs), creating an Adaptation Committee, the MRV requirements and inserting emission reduction commitments by developed countries in a decision.

The continuity of the multilateral climate change negotiation process really does depend on this balancing act, as any false move risks pushing the process off the rails and blocking the negotiations. Should this happen, the scale of efforts to address climate change would then depend on the ambition of national actions by governments and by regional or bilateral agreements negotiated on an ad hoc basis outside the United Nations framework.

## **FACT SHEETS**

### **Sheet 1.**

#### **The regional groups and the main negotiation coalitions**

The climate change negotiations process revolves around regional groups and negotiation coalitions. The regional groups are derived from the official United Nations classification system, according to their geographical situation, whilst the negotiation coalitions are political alliances formed on the basis of common interests. During negotiations, the countries usually speak on their own behalf or on behalf of a negotiation coalition.

#### **United Nations Regional Groups**

The regional groups do not necessarily share the same interests in relation to the negotiations on climate change. The members of the Bureau are elected within regional groups and Small Island Developing States (SIDS).

The regional groups are Africa, Asia and the Pacific Region (including Japan), Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC, from the Spanish) and the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG). "The others" are Australia, Canada, the United States, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland.

#### **The African Group**

The African Group is the only regional group to function as a genuine negotiation coalition. It has 53 members, all of whom share a variety of causes for concern, such as desertification, the lack of water resources, vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and the fight against poverty. The Group currently makes joint statements, mainly on questions relating to adaptation, technology transfer, capacity building and financing.

#### **Negotiation coalitions**

##### **AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States)**

AOSIS is an ad hoc lobbying group which gives a voice to the majority of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) during negotiations at the United Nations. The SIDS share their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, especially the rise in sea levels which is threatening the very existence of several islands. AOSIS has 39 members and four observers. Most AOSIS countries also belong to the Group of 77 and China and ten are among the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)<sup>28</sup>. Bahrain is the only SIDS member of the United Nations which does not belong to AOSIS; conversely, the Cook Islands and Niue belong to AOSIS but are not SIDS members of the United Nations<sup>29</sup>.

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28. See <http://www.sidsnet.org/aosis> and <http://www.unohrrls.org/en/ldc/related/62/>.

29. See: <http://www.unohrrls.org/en/sids/44/>.

### **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**

The group of LDCs comprises 49 countries among the least developed (33 in Africa, fifteen in Asia and one in the Caribbean). They defend their interests jointly with the United Nations, especially in relation to climate change. They share considerations about their vulnerability and their need for support in planning their adaptation. The UNFCCC also recognizes the special needs of the LDCs, which are the least capable of facing up to the impacts of climate change.

### **The Group of 77 and China (G-77/China)**

The G-77/China comprises 130 developing countries and China. China is an associate member rather than a full member of the G-77. China cooperates closely with the G-77 over climate change-related issues; the group therefore takes its positions "on behalf of the G77 and China"<sup>30</sup>. In particular, the G-77/China supports the economic interests of its members in miscellaneous questions within the United Nations. The G-77/China member countries can sometimes adopt diverging positions during the climate change negotiations, which they then defend via another negotiation coalition or regional group<sup>31</sup>.

### **European Union (EU)**

The EU is a political and economic union of 27 member countries. It is represented by the European Community, which is a Party to the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, but which has no voting right distinct from that of individual countries. Despite some differences, they often adopt a common position and speak with a single voice during climate change negotiations.

### **Umbrella Group**

The Umbrella Group is a flexible coalition of developed countries which do not belong to the European Union and which has been formed in the context of climate change negotiations. It has emerged from the JUSSCANNZ<sup>32</sup> group and is active in all the UN forums despite the group not always comprising the same countries. Although informal, the list normally includes Australia, Canada, the United States, Russia, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Ukraine (other countries are added periodically, depending on the topics addressed). The group has been focusing its activities since 2001 on information sharing rather than actual negotiation.

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30. Yamin and Depledge, 2004.

31. See [www.g77.org](http://www.g77.org).

32. JUSSCANNZ is the acronym for Japan, the USA, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand.

### **Coalition for Rainforest Nations**

This coalition started to take shape in 2005 under the initiative of Papua New Guinea. Its goal is recognition of the efforts made by developing countries to slow down emissions caused by deforestation. This coalition includes 32 countries: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Uganda, Uruguay and Vanuatu<sup>33</sup>.

### **Environmental Integrity Group**

The Environmental Integrity Group was formed in 2002 by three OECD members which did not agree with the positions adopted by the Umbrella Group, namely Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico and the Republic of Korea. Mexico and the Republic of Korea are the only two OECD members not included in Annex I. Member countries are frequently known to negotiate on an individual basis given the huge differences in their national contexts<sup>34</sup>. Otherwise, the group is normally coordinated by Switzerland.

### **Group of Countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Albania and Moldova (CACAM)**

CACAM groups countries from Eastern and Central Europe and Central Asia, including Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. There are also observers, such as Azerbaijan. These countries have created a coalition seeking recognition for their status as non-Annex I countries with economies in transition under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol<sup>35</sup>. The reason is that the UNFCCC does not define the term "developing country" clearly and that these countries do not view themselves as developing countries despite their exclusion from Annex I of the Convention. The CACAM countries rarely take a common stance on other issues.

### **Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA, from the Spanish)**

ALBA was originally a political, social and economic organization to promote cooperation in these areas between the socialist countries of Latin America and the Caribbean and offer an alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas advocated by the

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33. See: [www.rainforestcoalition.org](http://www.rainforestcoalition.org).

34. Yamin, F. and Depledge, J., 2004.

35. *Ibid.*

United States<sup>36</sup>. ALBA thus became a negotiation coalition in 2010, representing a hub of five countries: Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Antigua and Barbuda, joined occasionally by Dominica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. This coalition bases its positions on a goal of restricting temperature rises to 1 to 1.5°C and on the principle whereby the developed countries must take a lead partner role in the global effort to combat climate change.

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36. See: <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=shopage&pid=258>.

## Sheet 2.

### Positions of main countries and negotiation coalitions on the post-2012.

#### Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)<sup>37</sup>

AOSIS believes that the goals of reduced GHG emissions are founded on stabilizing the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide at 350 ppm and limiting average global warming to below 1.5°C. It estimates that global GHG emissions should reach their ceiling in 2015 and be reduced by 85% by 2050 compared with 1990 levels. AOSIS is asking that Annex I Parties achieve a 45% drop in their emissions by 2015 and 90% by 2050 compared with 1990 levels.

AOSIS supports the creation of a permanent body for adaptation under the auspices of the Convention and a committee to provide technical support and advice on the technical aspects of adaptation projects. AOSIS is also in favour of setting up an insurance mechanism for extreme events. AOSIS has also supported the possibility of creating a "common space" between the two *ad hoc* working groups to discuss the magnitude of the global emission reduction target of the Annex I Parties.

#### Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA, from the Spanish)<sup>38</sup>

ALBA bases its position on the principles stated in the World People's Declaration on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth<sup>39</sup> of 22 April 2010, adopted during the conference of the same name held in Cochabamba, Bolivia on 19-22 April 2010. ALBA is demanding goals to stabilize the concentration of carbon dioxide at 300 ppm, with a limitation in temperature rise of between 1 and 1.5°C. ALBA maintains that the developed countries should reduce their emissions by 50% for the 2013-2017 period compared with 1990 levels as part of a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. ALBA wishes the Adaptation Fund to be part of the Convention's financial mechanism and that it supervises compliance with financial commitments made by developed countries. ALBA believes that developed countries must make sure that their technologies are free of patents and intellectual property rights.

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37. IISD, 2010b, p.8, IISD, 2010c, p.6 and FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.2.

38. FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.2.

39. For further information on this meeting, see: <http://pwccc.wordpress.com/2010/04/24/peoples-agreement/>.

- South Africa**<sup>40</sup> South Africa favours a two-pronged approach. It supports positive incentives to stimulate the participation of developing countries. South Africa wants the directives from the international consultation and analysis to respect national sovereignty and for the consultations to take place in a multilateral framework. As such, it encourages granting fast-start financing as quickly as possible.
- Saudi Arabia**<sup>41</sup> Saudi Arabia, a major oil exporter, emphasizes the need to take account of potential negative impacts from mitigation measures by Annex I Parties on the economy of developing countries, above all those exporting fossil energy. Saudi Arabia thus supports compensation for losses and damages attributable to the impacts of response measures. Saudi Arabia has therefore opposed strongly the preparation of a technical document on the options for restricting the rise in the average world temperature to below 1.5°C and 2°C. It would also like to see carbon capture and storage projects as eligible activities under the clean development mechanism (CDM).
- Brazil**<sup>42</sup> Brazil would like Annex I Parties to reduce their emissions by 40% for the 2013-2017 period compared with 1990 levels and to define their commitments using a top-down approach reflecting scientific findings on climate change. It has also expressed the desire to reduce its GHG emissions by 36.1% to 38.9% by 2020. It takes the view that the recommendations for actions taken in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner (MRV) should be applied to implementing sustainable development actions by developing countries regarding their expected results in terms of reducing GHG emissions. Brazil is also in favour of instigating a compensation mechanism for losses and damage caused by the negative impacts of climate change in developing countries. Brazil considers that financing should come mainly from public funds to ensure predictability and be supplemented by auctioning of assigned amount units (AAU). It has also called for the creation of a fund governed by the Convention for this financing.

40. IISD, 2010b, p.7, 9 and 23; FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.3, p.10.

41. IISD, 2010b, p.6 and p.24; FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4 (Part II).

42. Communication by Brazil to the UNFCCC Secretariat, 29 January 2010: [http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/application/pdf/brazilcphaccord\\_app2.pdf](http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/application/pdf/brazilcphaccord_app2.pdf). IISD, 2010b, p.8, 10. FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/MISC.5/Add.1, p.10, FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4 (Part I).



<b>China</b> <sup>43</sup>	China is open to introducing certain measures to combat climate change through nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs), provided that the developed countries offer technological and financial support which can also contribute to the sustainable development and energy security of the country. Favouring a goal of 40% less emissions by Annex I Parties by 2020, China maintains that the contribution by developing countries to the global mitigation effort will depend on these Parties achieving their financing and technology transfer commitments. In terms of the financial mechanism, China favours developing a multi-window system with a close link with themed bodies. It also wishes that the mechanism be placed under the authority and management of the COP.
<b>Coalition for Rainforest Nations</b> <sup>44</sup>	The aim of this coalition is the recognition of the efforts made by developing countries to slow down emissions caused by deforestation. This coalition is campaigning for the adoption of a REDD-Plus agreement.
<b>Republic of Korea</b> <sup>45</sup>	The Republic of Korea supports the idea that a post-2012 regime should include incentives to encourage developing countries to make voluntary commitments to reduce GHG emissions in the form of nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs), provided that the developed countries offer technological and financial support. South Korea proposes setting up a registry for these actions. The NAMAs implemented without support could also be registered on a voluntary basis.
<b>United States</b> <sup>46</sup>	Having until recently rejected any negotiation process under the auspices of the UNFCCC, the United States did a U-turn in 2007 by maintaining that the Convention was the appropriate forum for negotiations on a post-2012 regime <sup>47</sup> . The United States wishes to give precedence to a national target for reducing GHG emis-

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43. IISD, 2010b, p.10, IISD, 2010c, p.4; FCCC/KP/AWG/2009/MISC.8 and FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4 (Part I).

44. Parker, *et al.*, 2009.

45. FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.2.

46. FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.2, p.79.

47. The United States made these statements mainly at the G8 Summit at Heiligen-damm in June 2007 and during the meeting of APEC leaders in Sydney in September 2007.

sions. It rejects any idea of bringing two ad hoc working groups together, as it has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol. It wishes to operationalize Copenhagen's target of 2°C and supports a legally-binding agreement inasmuch as all countries have obligations. The United States is demanding greater participation by developing countries in reducing GHG emissions. It supports the adoption of a REDD-Plus agreement and wishes to see developing countries implement nationally appropriate mitigation actions meeting recommendations for actions taken in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner (MRV). It suggests four MRV "baskets": international MRV for the Annex I Parties; national MRV and international consultation and analysis for actions of supported and unsupported non-Annex I Parties; international MRV for the financial and technological support of actions; and additional international MRV for the supported actions of non-Annex I Parties. In terms of financing, the United States is in favour of establishing the Copenhagen Green Fund as an operations entity of the Convention's financial mechanism and a registry for actions to be taken by developing countries.

G-77/China<sup>48</sup>

Given the historical responsibility of developed countries, G-77/China considers that the negotiations for a post-2012 regime should focus on the Annex I Parties adopting restrictive targets for reducing GHG emissions covering all sectors of the economy. G-77/China believes that the mitigation efforts by developed countries should be defined under a top-down approach and reflect scientific findings on climate change. The group agrees that the negotiations must lead to the adoption of a legally-binding agreement. The group is also seeking more support from developed countries, especially for financing the adaptation and technology transfers. G-77/China also highlights the need for international recognition of developing countries using their own resources. It supports the creation of a permanent body for adaptation, an insurance mechanism for losses and damage caused by extreme events and setting up a technical and performance indicators committee to measure the support for capacity building.

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48. IISD, 2010b, p.5, 6 and 7; IISD, 2010c, p5; FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.5.

**The African Group<sup>49</sup>**

The African Group suggests that the Annex I Parties achieve a 40 % drop in their emissions by 2020 compared with 1990 levels. This group is in favour of adopting nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing countries which comply with the MRV requirements, provided that financial and technological support is provided by the developed countries. It supports the creation of a permanent body for adaptation under the auspices of the Convention. It is pressing for a simplified procedure for providing support, including direct access, and considers that a finance commission should allocate funds based on recommendations from technical committees created for specific topics.

**Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)<sup>50</sup>**

The EIG mainly supports the creation of new market mechanisms and the strengthening of the CDM. It also believes that the international consultation and analysis should facilitate developing country mitigation measures, build up capacities and improve transparency.

**India**

India is demanding the adoption of ambitious reduction goals for Annex I Parties. India supports developing country implementation of nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) on a voluntary basis provide the developed countries provide financial and technological support. Its supports putting together a registry for actions seeking support and using national communications to report supported and unsupported mitigation actions. India is against any international examination of developing country mitigation actions. India is in favour of the objective of limiting the rise in temperature to below 2°C provided that this includes the principle of fair distribution of the carbon space based on the per capita cumulative share of emissions. It favours an international adaptation fund and a multilateral financial mechanism under the Convention. India is also in favour of creating technological innovation centres and a mechanism to facilitate access to technologies.

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49. IISD, 2010b, p.5, 6 and 8; IIDD, 2010c, p.12.

50. IISD, 2010b, p.9 and 11.

<b>Japan</b> <sup>51</sup>	Japan believes that all Parties should be involved in the mitigation efforts through mandatory emission reductions, either by amending the Protocol or by reaching a new agreement. It is therefore in favour of adopting a wide, legally-binding agreement which includes the major economies and supports cooperation between the ad hoc working groups. Japan supports the global objective of a 50% drop in emissions by 2050.
<b>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)</b> <sup>52</sup>	The OPEC countries, especially Saudi Arabia, wish to see the carbon capture and storage projects recognized within the CDM, where appropriate. They emphasize the need to consider the potential negative impacts of mitigation measures in the Annex I Parties on developing country economies. These countries have therefore blocked in 2010 a request by several Parties to the Secretariat to prepare a technical document on the options for limiting the rise in the average global temperature to below 1.5°C or 2°C.
<b>Group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs)</b> <sup>53</sup>	The Group of LDCs are pressing for the creation of regional centres and networks to facilitate the implementation of adaptation measures. It also supports widening the scope of acceptable LU-LUCF activities under the CDM. It considers that funds should be supplied by the respective themed committees under the general supervision of a finance committee.
<b>Russia</b> <sup>54</sup>	Russia is in favour of adopting a restrictive agreement which includes major emitting countries and is opposed to adopting simple amendments to the Protocol. Russia, supported by Japan, is also in favour of increased cooperation between the two AWGs. It is opposed to withdrawing the special status of countries with economies in transition.

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51. IISD, 2010b, p.5 IISD, 2010c, p.13; FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.3, p.7; FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/MISC.6, p.12.

52. IISD, 2010b, p.27; IISD, 2010c, p.5; OPEC, 2006.

53. IISD, 2010b, p.5, 6 and 15.

54. IISD, 2010b, p.4; IISD 2010c, p.3 and 13.

**European  
Union<sup>55</sup>**

The European Union wishes the rise in the average global temperature to be stabilized at 2oC. Under a post-2012 global agreement, the European Union is committed to reducing its emissions by 20% by 2020 compared with 1990 levels and by 30% if the other developed countries, including the United States, commit to similar reductions and if the most advanced developing countries commit to contributing to this objective based on their respective responsibilities and capabilities. The European Union has also suggested an accreditation mechanism for economic sectors. Developing countries would use this mechanism to fix an emissions threshold below the emissions level which corresponds to business as usual. Any drop in emissions beyond the threshold would be rewarded by the granting of units.

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55. FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/MISC.5/Add.1, p.8; and the European Union Communication to the UNFCCC Secretariat de la CCNUCC, 28 January 2010, see: [http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/application/pdf/europeanunioncphaccord\\_app1.pdf](http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/application/pdf/europeanunioncphaccord_app1.pdf)

### Sheet 3.

#### UNFCCC side discussion forums

A highlight of 2010 was the holding of miscellaneous formal and informal forums. Most of them were aiming to move the negotiations forward and thus achieve an ambitious result in Cancún. Each of these forums is described below followed by a table which analyses the progress they have made in the miscellaneous questions raised during their meetings in 2010 (see Table 5).

#### World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth<sup>56</sup>

**Present:** Nearly 35,000 representatives of social movements and 56 government delegations<sup>57</sup>.

**Description:** The World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth was organized at the initiative of Evo Morales, President of Bolivia. The first conference, held in Cochabamba, Bolivia on 19-22 April 2010 culminated in the adoption of the World People's Declaration on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth. The aim of this conference was to assemble participants with a wide variety of outlooks, including social movements and government delegations, to react to the results of the 15th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (Copenhagen, December 2009). A second conference is scheduled for 2011.

#### Informal ministerial meeting on climate held in Petersberg<sup>58</sup>

**Present:** 43 countries.

**Description:** This Dialogue was a joint initiative by Mexico and Germany. The aim was to move discussions forward, with a view to achieving an ambitious result during the COM-16 in Cancún, and to reach agreement on the role of the Copenhagen Accord in this process. The participating countries debated the various issues (mitigation, adaptation, REDD and so on) within specialist working groups. Germany, South Africa and South Korea launched an initiative at this meeting to support developing countries in formulating mitigation strategies based on principles of transparency and measurability.

The meeting was held in Petersberg, Germany on 2-4 May 2010.

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56. For further information on this meeting, see:

<http://pwccc.wordpress.com/2010/04/24/peoples-agreement/>.

57. According to "Press Conference By Bolivia's President On People's Congress", see:

[http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs//2010/100507\\_Morales.doc.htm](http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs//2010/100507_Morales.doc.htm).

58. *New momentum for international climate negotiations*, Press release, May 4, 2010.

Voir: [https://www.bmu.de/english/current\\_press\\_releases/pm/45968.php](https://www.bmu.de/english/current_press_releases/pm/45968.php).

### Paris-Oslo REDD-Plus Process<sup>59</sup>

**Present:** 54 countries in Paris and 55 in Oslo plus participants from the civil society

**Description:** Initiated jointly by France and Norway, the Paris-Oslo REDD-Plus Process is aiming to instigate a transparent, interim REDD-Plus partnership. The partnership claims to be a initiative to supplement the UNFCCC negotiation process. The Parties established the partnership during the second conference in Oslo and confirmed the fast-start financing intended for the REDD-Plus actions. The main objective of the partnership is to act as a temporary platform used by the partners to intensify the REDD-Plus actions and financing and to take immediate measures to improve the efficiency, transparency and coordination of initiatives and existing financial instruments, to increase the transfer of knowledge and expand skills.

A first meeting was held in Paris, France on 11 March 2010, followed by a second meeting in Oslo, Norway on 27 May 2010.

### Ministerial meetings of BASIC countries<sup>60</sup>

**Present:** Brazil, South Africa, India and China.

**Description:** Recalling their contribution to the work of the 15th COP (December 2009), the BASIC countries met several times in 2010 to decide on a joint stance. Starting their association with the Copenhagen Accord, they support a two-pronged approach and reaching a legally-binding agreement included a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol and an agreement under the auspices of the UNFCCC.

The participating countries met officially in 2010 in New Delhi, India (24 January), Cape Town, South Africa (25-26 April), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (25-26 July) and in China (10-11 October).

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59. *REDD+ Partnership, Adopted, May 27, 2010.* See: <http://www.oslocfc2010.no/pop.cfm?FuseAction=Doc&pAction=View&pDocumentId=25017>

60. *Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of the Second Meeting of Ministers of BASIC Group, New Delhi, January, 24th, 2010,* see: <http://moef.nic.in/downloads/public-information/JointStatement.pdf>; Third Meeting of BASIC Group Issues Joint Statement, see: <http://climate-l.org/news/third-meeting-of-basic-group-issues-joint-statement/>; et Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of the Fourth Meeting of Ministers of the BASIC Group, July 26, 2010, see: <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/joint-statement-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-fourth-meeting-of-ministers-of-the-basic-group-rio-de-janeiro-25-26-july-2010>.

61. Co-Chairs' Summary of the Geneva Dialogue on Climate Finance, 15 September 2010, voir: [www.bafu.admin.ch/dokumentation/fokus/10001/.../index.html?lang](http://www.bafu.admin.ch/dokumentation/fokus/10001/.../index.html?lang).

### **Informal ministerial meeting on climate financing held in Geneva<sup>61</sup>**

**Present:** 46 countries.

**Description:** A joint initiative by Switzerland and Mexico, this meeting was an informal debate on issues of climate finance. Participants discussed the future architecture of financing, new climate funds, the role of the private sector and long-term sources of financing. The aim of these discussions was to move the international climate change negotiations specific to financing forward to reach an ambitious result in Cancún.

The participants met in Geneva, Switzerland on 2-3 September 2010.

### **G8 Summits**

**Member countries (8):** United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada and Russia

**Description:** This informal group of the eight most developed countries in the world meets annually to discuss economic questions and global issues such as combating climate change. Developing countries are frequently invited to G8 summits<sup>62</sup>. The European Union is represented at each meeting. During the last G8 meeting in Muskoka, Canada on 25-26 June 2010, the assembled leaders discussed means of combating global warming<sup>63</sup>.

### **G20 Summits**

**Member countries (19 + European Union):** Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and the European Union.

**Description:** The G20 held its first meeting in reaction to the global economic crisis in November 2008 during the Washington Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy. The Summit was also attended by the President of the World Bank, the Secretary General of the United Nations, the Director of the International Monetary Fund and the President of the Financial Stability Forum. The political leaders put together an action plan in Washington, which was reviewed at the London Summit in April 2009, to improve transparency and financial responsibility, promote the integrity of financial markets and reform the international financial institutions. De-

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62. For example, in 2010, invitations were extended to South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Colombia, Haiti and Jamaica.

63. G8 Muskoka Declaration Recovery and New Beginnings, Muskoka (Canada) 25-26 June 2010, see: <http://g8.gc.ca/g8-summit/summit-documents/g8-muskoka-declaration-recovery-and-new-beginnings/>



clarations by the G20 frequently cover climate change. During the G20 meeting in Toronto, the participating countries associated with the Copenhagen Accord reiterated their support for the Accord and called on other countries to join them<sup>64</sup>. In 2010, the G20 met in Toronto, Canada (26-27 June) and Seoul, South Korea (11-13 November).

### **Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate**

**Present** (17): Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, United Kingdom, United States and the European Union<sup>65</sup>.

**Description:** The Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate is a United States initiative assembling the main GHG emitting countries. The aim is to encourage agreement on a post-2012 international climate regime.

In 2010, the Summits of this Forum took place in Washington DC, USA (19 April)<sup>66</sup>, Rome, Italy (30 June-1 July)<sup>67</sup> and in Washington DC, USA (20-21 September)<sup>68</sup>.

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64. The G-20 Toronto Summit Declaration, 26-27 June 2010, see: <http://canadainternational.gc.ca/g20/summit-sommet/2010/toronto-declaration-toronto.aspx?lang=eng>.

65. See: <http://www.state.gov/g/oes/climate/mem/>.

66. The Sixth Leaders' Representatives Meeting, Chair's Summary: Sixth Meeting of the Leaders' Representatives of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, 19 April 2010 – Washington, DC, USA, see: <http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org/past-meetings/the-sixth-leaders-representatives-meeting.html>

67. Seventh Meeting of the Leaders' Representatives of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate: Co-Chair's Summary, Rome, Italy, June 30, 2010, see: <http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/remarks/2010/144072.htm>.

68. Chair's Summary: Eighth Meeting of the Leaders' Representatives of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, Washington, DC, September 22, 2010, see: <http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/other/2010/147661.htm>.

TABLE 5.  
DISCUSSION ELEMENTS ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND A POST-2012 REGIME

<div>Forums</div> <div>→</div>	World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth	Informal ministerial meeting on climate held in Petersberg	Paris-Oslo REDD-Plus Process	Ministerial meetings of BASIC countries
<div>Issues</div> <div>↓</div>				
Post-2012 regime and UNFCCC's role in the process	Supports a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol	Encourages the implementation of climate protection measures at the same time as United Nations negotiations.		Central role of the UNFCCC. Need to reach a legally-binding agreement at Cancún. Need to create a mechanism to report the results of forums held by a group of States.
Copenhagen Accord	Rejects the Copenhagen Accord.		Supports the Copenhagen Accord.	Supports the Copenhagen Accord.
Reduction goals	Stabilization of concentration of carbon dioxide at 300 ppm. Reducing the rise in global tempe- rature to 2°C is not enough. The developed countries must reduce their emissions by 50% for the 2013-2017 period compared with 1990 levels.	Reducing the rise in global temperature to 2°C. Reducing GHG emissions of developed and newly-industrialized countries is a priority for the next negotiation sessions.		

**TABLE 5. (suite)  
DISCUSSION ELEMENTS ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND A POST-2012 REGIME**

Forums → ↓ Issues	World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth	Informal ministerial meeting on climate held in Petersberg	Paris-Oslo REDD-Plus Process	Ministerial meetings of BASIC countries
	Condemnation of market mechanisms and their use by developed countries.	The MRV recommendations are a priority for the next negotiation sessions.		The MRV recommendations for the actions of developed countries must be different from the actions of developing countries. National MRV and an international consultation and analysis process (ICA) will be applied to unsupported nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs).
<b>Adaptation</b>	The Adaptation Fund must be part of the Convention's financial mechanism and should supervise compliance with financial commit- ments made by developed countries.	Support for developing country adaptation measures is a priority for the next negotiation sessions.		
<b>Technology</b>	The developed countries must meet the costs of transferring tech- nologies to developing countries.			

TABLE 5. (suite)  
DISCUSSION ELEMENTS ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND A POST-2012 REGIME

Forums → ↓ Issues	World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth	Informal ministerial meeting on climate held in Petersberg	Paris-Oslo REDD-Plus Process	Ministerial meetings of BASIC countries
	<p><b>Financing</b></p> <p>The developed countries must allocate 6% of their GNP in addition to the public development aid to supporting developing countries in their efforts to combat climate change.</p>	<p>Financing is a priority for the next negotiation sessions.</p>	<p>\$4 billion have been committed by the developed country participants to REDD activities in developing countries.</p>	<p>Call for the granting of fast-start financing, especially when intended for the most vulnerable countries, the African countries and island States.</p> <p>Need to adopt a common format to take stock of financial contributions by developed countries.</p>
	<p><b>REDD</b></p> <p>Condemnation of market-based mechanisms, including REDD, REDD + and REDD ++.</p>		<p>Setting up a voluntary, non-restrictive REDD partnership, with the goal of acting as an interim platform whilst a future mechanism is negotiated under the UNFCCC</p>	

**TABLE 5. (suite)  
DISCUSSION ELEMENTS ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND A POST-2012 REGIME**

Forums →	G8 Summit	G20 Summits	Informal ministerial meeting on climate financing	Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate
↓ Issues →				
Post-2012 regime and UNFCCC's role in the process	Need for a restrictive, ambitious, fair and efficient global agreement for all countries, which will list the respective responsibilities of all the main economies with the aim of reducing GHG emissions.	Supports the UNFCCC process.		Importance of moving forward in Cancún, especially in terms of adaptation, mitigation, REDD-Plus, MRV, financing and technology transfer. Divided on renewing the Kyoto Protocol. Need to have realistic expectations for Cancún.
Copenhagen Accord	Supports the UNFCCC process. Supports the Copenhagen Accord. Calls for effective implementation of the Accord, including the MRV recommendations.	The countries associated with the Copenhagen Accord have reiterated their support for the Accord and called on others to join them.		The countries associated with the Copenhagen Accord have underlined the need to reflect the Accord in any future agreement on a post-2012 regime. Call for rapid implementation of the Accord in terms of the fast-start financing.

TABLE 5. (suite)  
DISCUSSION ELEMENTS ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND A POST-2012 REGIME

Forums → ↓ Issues	G8 Summit	G20 Summits	Informal ministerial meeting on climate financing	Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate
Mitigation	Reducing the rise in global temperature to 2°C. Global objective of a 50% drop by 2050. Emissions peak as quickly as possible. Objective of 80% by 2050 compared with 1990 levels for developed countries. Comparability of efforts undertaken. Need for quantifiable measures from large emerging economies. Very strict joint and individual reduction objectives for the developed countries.			Importance of agreeing on the MRV requirements and the international analysis and consultation in Cancún. The ICA process must be led by the Parties and not given a political dimension. The national communications are a good starting point for the MRV requirements for developing country actions.
Adaptation	Need to widen research. Recognition of the special situation of the poorest and most vulnerable countries. Pooling of adaptation plans during a conference on adaptation (Russia, 2011).			

**TABLE 5. (suite)  
DISCUSSION ELEMENTS ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND A POST-2012 REGIME**

Forums →	G8 Summit	G20 Summits	Informal ministerial meeting on climate financing	Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate
↓ Issues →				
Technology	Major role of the carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology and of nuclear energy. Abolition of reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers to encourage technological dissemination.			
Financing	Setting up respective contributions under the fast-start financing to meet the most pressing needs of the most vulnerable developing countries. Supports the work of the United Nations Secretary General's High-Level Consultative Group.	Supports the work of the United Nations Secretary General's High-Level Consultative Group.	Need to create a new fund attached to the Convention's financial mechanism and liable to the COP. Private sector commitment must not become a substitute for public financing despite its importance. Financing architecture proposal.Importance of complying the MRV recommendations.	Importance of providing the fast-start financing transparently.
REDD	Supports the Paris-Oslo process on the REDD-Plus mechanism.			Supports the Paris-Oslo process on the REDD-Plus mechanism.

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## L'ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DE LA FRANCOPHONIE (OIF)

The International Organization of La Francophonie (OIF) is an institution founded on a shared language - French - and shared values. It has fifty-six member States and governments and nineteen observers. With members spread across all five continents, it accounts for nearly a third of the member States of the United Nations.

The OIF supports its members in preparing their policies and carries out multilateral cooperation actions, in accordance with the major missions set out by the Summit of the Francophonie: promoting the French language and cultural and linguistic diversity; promoting peace, democracy and human rights; supporting education, training, higher education and research; developing cooperation to ensure sustainable development and solidarity

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### Nineteen observers

Austria • Bosnia Herzegovina • Croatia • Czech Republic • Dominican Republic • Estonia • Georgia • Hungary • Latvia • Lithuania • Montenegro • Mozambique • Poland • Serbia • Slovakia • Slovenia • Thailand • Ukraine • United Arab Emirates.

[www.francophonie.org](http://www.francophonie.org)



## LA FRANCOPHONIE AU SERVICE DU DÉVELOPPEMENT DURABLE

The *Institut de l'énergie et de l'environnement de la Francophonie* (IEPF - Energy and Environment Institute of the French-speaking World) was born in 1988 from a desire of Heads of State and Government for cooperative action to develop the energy sector in member countries. This action was expanded to the environment in 1996.

Based in Quebec City, the Institute today is assisting in:

- training and capacity-building in sustainable development of various categories of development players in French-speaking countries in the energy and environment sectors;
- developing partnerships in the energy and environment sectors for sustainable development.

Its 2010-2013 programme, in synergy with other programmes of the International Organization of La Francophonie, especially under mission D of the Ten-year strategic framework of the Francophonie - "Developing cooperation to ensure sustainable development and solidarity" - IEPF:

- Helps to prepare national sustainable development policies and strategies and implement them in the energy and environment sectors; trains and enhances the ability of supervisors and professionals to use and master environmental management tools for sustainable development.
- Supports the participation of countries in international negotiations on the environment and sustainable development and the implementation of conventions, through discussions, technical support and mobilization of experts.
- Develops partnerships, publishes guides, specialist journals and scientific and technical works in French in the energy and environment sectors.
- Coordinates information and expertise networks for sustainable development.
- Carries out any other function entrusted to it by the competent OIF bodies.

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To meet the objective of the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (UNFCCC) to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere "at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system", the Kyoto Protocol calls for quantified reductions in developed countries' GHG emissions for the 2008-2012 period. If this ultimate Convention objective is to be achieved in the long term, efforts to reduce emissions must continue beyond 2012, by agreeing on a post-2012 regime.

As the Copenhagen Summit (2009) failed to conclude a legally-binding agreement, government representatives of more than two hundred countries will meet in Cancún, Mexico (29 November-10 December 2010), under the auspices of the UNFCCC, to continue negotiations on a post-2012 regime, this time under the leadership of the new UNFCCC Executive Secretary, Mrs Christiana Figueres. Although it now seems obvious that the Cancún negotiations will not achieve the agreement expected in Copenhagen, the results of the Cancún negotiations will be decisive in ensuring the continuity of the multilateral climate change process towards a legally-binding agreement. The challenge will be to set the necessary milestones for continued negotiations without prejudging the final outcome.

The aim of this guide is to help participants understand better the main issues which will be discussed at the Cancún Conference. The negotiations on the post-2012 period will predominate, but other topics on the current regime are also on the agenda, including the improved framework for technology development and transfer and adaptation. Although this guide is intended especially for negotiators from member countries of the International Organisation of la Francophonie (OIF), we hope that it will also be useful to delegates with a wide variety of outlooks.



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