




### Mobilizing \$100 billion by 2020

- \$100 billion commitment still largely a blank slate that countries are free to interpret as they see fit
  - pace of scaling up from FSF levels steady progress or hockey stick?
  - Amount of public finance crucial -two illustrative scenarios
    - \$10b public, with say \$5 b for mitigation leveraging \$50 million
       private remaining gap creates incentive for creative accounting;
    - \$90-\$100 public with \$40-50 billion for mitigation leveraging
       \$500 billion in private investment;
  - How \$100 billion commitment is met has huge implications for mitigation ambition, and the ability of the poor and vulnerable to cope with changes

# Should we rely on government budgets as only source of public finance?

#### Net official development assistance


As a percentage of gross national income






#### Trends in national debts

Figure 1.6. General Government Gross Debt Ratios (Percent of GDP; 2009 PPP-GDP weighted average)



#### Developed countries have accumulated huge financial debt

Figure 3.3. Change in Public Debt Outlook, 2008–15 (Percent of GDP)



Source: October 2010 WEO.



## Innovative sources of public funds to supplement budget contributions

Government budgets aren't the only possible source of public finance under UNFCCC

Definition of innovative source: Instruments that generate public finance directly, outside government budgets or earmarked, for international public goods – e.g., climate action

#### Examples of innovative sources:

- measures to address international transport
- Financial Transaction Taxes (FTTs),
- international allowance auctioning (AAUs, SoP/CERs)
- Special Drawing Rights,



## Example: International maritime transport

(bunkers)





#### **Example: Maritime transport (shipping)**

Shipping is large and growing source of emissions;

Progress stalled for years over competing principles in UNFCCC and IMO;

CBDR can be addressed in a global mechanism with no cost burden ("no net incidence") on developing countries;

- agreement on a global mechanism to address emissions in the sector that can also generate revenue (ETS or levy)
- Rebate mechanism to compensate developing countries for their costs or burden, based on suitable "attribution key" (i.e., share of seaborn imports by value)
- Use remaining funds for climate finance, and use key to attribute contributions from developed countries
- Special attention to impacts on food prices, LDCs and SIDS

#### Compliance with UNFCCC Convention and CBDR

- Revenue goes to three streams:
  - Rebates/compensation to developing countries to address incidence on them, and to reflect equity and CBDR
  - Small amount of revenue used within shipping sector R&D and insector mitigation and adaptation actions
  - The majority of revenue, goes to the UNFCCC financial mechanism (GCF) to support climate actions in developing countries
- Consequently, the revenue for climate change action that contributes to meeting the \$100b commitment comes from consumers/economies from developed countries only;
- Some highly industrialized or wealthy NA1 countries could forego their rebate and contribute to the fund, but this would not country towards the \$100 billion.
- Need regular review of what countries are entitled to rebate, perhaps linked to evolving definition of financing responsibilities under UNFCCC.

#### Attribution Key's Usage

### (1) **Rebates** for developing countries<sup>1</sup>

Developing Coun	RK	Yey, %	n R Key		
China		0.00 0.11 0.27 0.00			
Korea, Republic of		0.06 0.02 0.03 0.16			
Singapore		0.59 0.21 0.00 0.00			
China, Taiwan Prov		0.00 Grenad 0.00 0.00 0.00			
China, Hong Kong		2.06	9 0.00 0.88 0.05 0.15 0.00		
India	1.98		0.00 0.00 2.35 0.00		
	Ν	15.31		0.80 0.11 0.09 0.00	
Remaining 120	4.19		0.01 0.13 0.02 of 0.05		
TOTAL no		10.19	1.34 0.00 0.00 0.00		
Lote o voire  Cuba  Sypnus  Djibouti  Dominican  Dominican Republic  Ecuador  Egypt  IS salvador  Equatorial Guinea  Ertirea  Ethiopia	0.0682 0.1123 0.0902 0.0044 0.0020 0.1415 0.1196 0.2499 0.0790 0.0288 0.0066 0.0592	Mauritus Mexico Micronesia (Federated Sta Moldova, Rep. of Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nauru Nepal Nicaraeua	0.0402 1.4594 0.00263 0.0075 0.0298 0.3182 0.0210 0.0304 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008	Imnidad and Tobago Turisha Turisha Turisha Turisha Unjand United Arab Emirates Uruguay Uzbekistan Vanuatu Venezuela (Bolivarian Viet Nam Yemen Zambia	0.07 0.18 0.02 0.00 0.03 1.26 0.03 0.04 0.00 Rep. o 0.36 0.51
Gabon	0.0204	Niger	0.0090	Zimbabwe	0.01

### (2) Credits for developed countries (for climate financing raised)

Developed Country/region		Attr Key %		
European Union*		28.53	FR: 2.	
United States of Ame	rica		15.98	
Japan			6.42	
Canada			1.98	Attr Key %
Turkey			1.64	0.0958 0.1143 0.0506
Australia			1.60	2.3298 0.3177
Russian Federation			1.40	0.4904 0.7256
Remaining 7 co	ountries	;	2.28	0.5020 0.5534 1.3992
TOTAL Annex-I	Parties	}	59.81	0.3236 0.0961
Germany	4.6015	S	oain	3.0122
Greece	0.7362		weden	0.9112
Hungary	0.4480		witzerland	0.5129
Iceland	0.0690		urkey	1.6386
Ireland Italy	0.5932 2.9651	_	kraine nited Kingdom	0.5624 3.9644
Japan	6.4161		nited States of America	15.9771

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Developing country can forego rebate or a part of it, and be recognized for such action; Thus the rebates may amount to 30% or less. Values provided in the GHG WG 3/3/11 document.



## Current negotiations on innovative finance and maritime sector

#### Multiple negotiating fora can contribute:

- UNFCCC the central decision-making fora:
  - signal to IMO/ICAO on CBDR and targets
  - governance of any revenue for climate finance
  - Important for int'l transport to be on agenda here
- IMO/ICAO technical bodies will implement and enforce any measures for shipping and aviation
  - Consideration of Market-Based Measures on-going:
    - IMO MBMs July 2014 key decision, complete by 2015
      - Rebate mechanism being actively discussed
    - ICAO active discussion 4 options this year, Nov key
- G20 (Potential forum for high-level discussions)



#### **Transition to post 2020**

Special role for bunkers in transition period to the post-2020 with binding commitments for all countries

- reinventing differentiation under CBDR&RC principal, with more emphasis on "RC";
- Bunkers was always toxic because it threatened the A1-NA1 "firewall" – equivalent treatment of all ships and plans regardless of country
- Now bunkers can be a testing ground for discussions of new approaches to differentiation
- Earlier the better to get robust differentiation included, especially if it generates revenue for climate finance before 2020.
- Clear understanding that it is "developed" countries that must contribute to \$100 b by 2020. After 2020 unknown.





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