## What can NAMAs learn from the CDM?

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- 1. Markets & market failures
- 2. Technology transfer
- 3. Sustainable development
- 4. Knowledge & actors
- 5. Data & supervision

### 1. Markets & market failures

- 2. Technology transfer
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## 1. Markets & market failures:

## While the CDM market mechanism generally works NAMAs should address important remaining market failures

#### Upsides:

Projects with lowest abatement cost identified

Countries/project types with lower risks and larger market size preferred by investors

- ⇒Market works relatively efficiently
- ⇒NAMAs should preferably be market-based

#### Shortcomings:

- Scale too low in order to reach 2C target
- High transaction costs
- ⇒scale-up (create large NAMAs)
- Baseline not addressed (fuel subsidies)
- ⇒Incentivise baseline activities (phase-out fuel subsidies)
- Problematic access to finance
- ⇒Create incentives for low-discount rate financing vehicles

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## **2. Technology transfer:**

## NAMAs should enable also smaller/ low-income countries to increase technological capabilities via technology transfer

#### **Upsides:**

- CDM has contributed to tech. transfer
- Quality of tech transfer has improved over time (from technology to knowledge transfer)
- Simple tech transfer has declined in countries where technological capabilities increased
- ⇒Technology sourcing under CDM works efficiently
- ⇒Also NAMAs should aim at qualitative improvement of tech transfer over time

#### Shortcomings:

- Learning effects of transfer limited to few countries
- Investors prefer large markets
- ⇒Build large potential markets via NAMAs (scale-up)
- ⇒A country's NAMAs should rather focus on few technologies that fit the country (e.g., high potentials)

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## 3. Sustainable Development:

# NAMAs should go beyond the CDM's incremental contribution to sustainable development and integrate development targets

#### **Upsides:**

CDM projects have mostly a positive sustainable development rent

Hardly negative effects

⇒CDM has incrementally contributed to its sustainable development goal

#### Shortcomings:

Often trade-off between both goals

Investors focus on first goal (except when additional rewards for sust. dev., e.g., through Gold Standard)

⇒NAMAs might increase incentives for contribution to sustainable development

Contributions often decoupled from development plans

Division of mitigation and adaptation targets

⇒NAMAs should build on development plans and potentially incorporate adaptation effects of mitigation measures

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## 4. Knowledge & actors:

## The large knowledge base created by the CDM should be transferred to and increased by NAMAs

### **Upsides:**

CDM has led to increased knowledge

- CDM specific knowledge
- General knowledge on emission abatement projects in developing countries

Knowledge is mainly carried by actors and within networks

⇒Transfer the relevant knowledge to NAMAs (keep relevant actors alive under NAMAs)

⇒Design NAMAs in a way that incentivises learning (markets)

#### Shortcomings:

Learning of political actors in host countries limited (DNAs)

⇒Design NAMAs in a manner that they feed-back into the policy process

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## 5. Data & supervision

## NAMAs should maintain the high data sourcing and low corruption potential of the CDM

#### **Upsides:**

CDM has led to improved publicly available database on developing countries

- Many data points
- Standardisation of data

⇒Common standards for reporting of NAMAs with high data requirements

CDM has shown relatively low potentials for corruption

⇒Assure high MRV levels for NAMAs

⇒Strictly couple finance of NAMAs to MRV quality

#### Shortcomings:

High transaction costs and long approval times

⇒Scale-up (select few projects)

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## Where NAMAs can draw from and where they should go beyond the CDM

#### Contributions from the CDM:

 Knowledge embedded in actors & networks

 Source of publicly available data

MRV

#### NAMAs:

 Selection of key technologies/project types according to needs and potentials

 Create preferably large markets for these technologies

 Support the building of technological capabilities for these technologies & increase local policy learning

#### Add-ons:

- Tackling of baseline
- Integration of development plans (potentials and needs)
- Involvement of new actors& finance vehicles



## Thank you for your attention!