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Bilateral and Mini-multilateral Agreements as Complements to the UNFCCC Process

Professor Kelly Sims Gallagher

THE CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT &
RESOURCE POLICY

The slow road to Paris

Year	Event
1992	UNFCCC
1995	Berlin Mandate
1997	Kyoto Protocol
1998	U.S. Senate fails to ratify
2005	Entry into force of Kyoto Protocol
2009	Copenhagen Accord
2011	Durban Platform
2012	Canadian withdrawal from Kyoto Protocol
2014	U.S.-China Joint Announcement
2015	Paris Agreement

23 years

Paris Agreement

Major achievements

1. Universality
2. Stabilization of global emissions
3. Climate finance
4. Ongoing process through Convention to potentially strengthen over time

Limitations

1. Slow process
 2. 0.7 degrees – 1.4 degrees Celsius (bigger if 1.5°C) gap
 3. Full implementation of NDCs?
 4. Deferment of some difficult issues
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Bi-lateral and Mini-Multilateral Agreements

Where shared interests exist, agreements among smaller, like-minded sets of countries are the new imperative.

Such agreements can:

- Initiate a virtuous cycle
 - Generate momentum for the UNFCCC process
 - Be negotiated and implemented more quickly
 - Be complementary rather than supplanting the UNFCCC regime
 - Have separate but equal standing as international agreements
 - Permit greater experimentation with new approaches since the risks of failure are smaller
 - Allow for first-mover advantage
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Conditions for Complementary Agreements

- Each new agreement must represent a measurable, additional improvement on the commitments in participating countries' INDCs.
 - Bilateral or mini-multilateral agreements are not complementary if they take steps backwards or undermine NDCs
 - New agreements can and should be enshrined at the COP each year so their cumulative impact is recognized and understood in stocktaking exercises
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Evidence

Brazil-Norway 2008



- Bi-lateral agreement between Norway and Brazil
 - Shared interest in reducing deforestation
 - Norway agreed to pay into an environmental fund if Brazil reduced its emissions from deforestation below the average rate of the 1996-2005 period
 - This performance-based payment system was later replicated in other countries
 - Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) approach later embraced by the UNFCCC
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U.S.-China Joint Agreements

The White House
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

November 11, 2014

FACT SHEET: U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change and Clean Energy Cooperation

President Obama Announces Ambitious 2025 Target to Cut U.S. Climate Pollution by 26-28 Percent from 2005 Levels



The White House
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

September 25, 2015

U.S.-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change

1. In November 2014, President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping stood together in Beijing to make a historic U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change, emphasizing their personal commitment to a successful climate agreement in Paris

The Outcomes

2014: Targets (“INDCs”)

- China: Peaking of CO₂ emissions and a 20% non-fossil primary energy target of “around” 2030 with “best efforts to peak early”
- USA: 26-28% reduction from 2005 levels with “best efforts to reach 28%”

2015: Implementation (“Don’t Wait for Paris”)

- Vision for Paris - “landing zones”
 - Domestic policy synchronization – power, light-duty vehicles, heavy duty vehicles, HFCs (China now leads on industrial sectoral coverage)
 - Green climate finance
 - Climate Leaders Summit (sub-national leadership)
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
Consequences of U.S.-China Joint Announcement

- Beginning of virtuous cycle of early INDCs
- Catalyst for domestic policy in both countries
 - Domestic Policy Dialogue
- Lima language on differentiation
- Paris Agreement



Example 1: Non-CO₂ Gases

Total annual anthropogenic GHG emissions by gases 1970–2010



Example 2: Resilience in Agriculture





fletcher.tufts.edu/cierp
kelly.gallagher@tufts.edu
Twitter: @kellysgallagher