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## Elements for the consideration of outputs component of the GST Submission to the UNFCCC

15 September 2023

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### Introduction

In order for the global stocktake (**GST**) to facilitate a course correction on the levels of ambition and implementation needed to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, Parties will need to translate the information and recommendations in the technical dialogue of the first global stocktake synthesis report by the co-facilitators on the technical dialogue (**TD-SYR**)<sup>1</sup> into clear and actionable political signals and commitments and do so in a manner that is transparent and allows them to be held accountable.

Ultimately, whether COP28 is judged a success will largely be determined by how the world responds to the outcomes of the GST and the COP more widely. Headline aspirations are not enough: COP28 must help drive a shift from incremental progress toward transformational levels

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<sup>1</sup> [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023\\_09\\_adv.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023_09_adv.pdf).



of implementation, fairness and ambition. In order to do so, Parties and non-Party stakeholders (*NPS*) could usefully:

- **Identify a limited number of key, specific, operational and transformative signals to emerge from COP28, including the GST**, across mitigation, adaptation and loss & damage (*L&D*), and means of implementation (*MOI*). The normative weight of the UNFCCC process should be leveraged to ensure that all stakeholders – national governments, local authorities, civil society, the private sector, national level practitioners, multilateral organizations and UN agencies, among others – align their efforts to deliver an effective response to COP28 and the GST. To add real value, COP28 and the GST need to send clear signals as to what Parties and NPS could usefully do after COP28 to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, both as part of an immediate response as well as through more ambitious nationally determined contributions (*NDCs*).
- **Enhance complementarity between these signals and the COP28 Presidency vision**, while pushing for refinement and more specificity as needed. For example, the Presidency vision calls for countries to pledge to “reach a global tripling of renewables capacity [...] by 2030,” whereas COP28 could also usefully call for an increasing share of renewable energy in electricity generation.<sup>2</sup>
- **Build momentum around the signals ahead of COP28**, including by activating existing relevant coalitions and initiatives around them, in particular the work of the High-Level Climate Champions (*HLCs*) (such as in relation to the 2030 Breakthroughs). Existing coalitions and initiatives of Parties and NPS will be vital to actively mount an effective 2024 response to the GST outcomes and to operationalize identified opportunities so as to harvest them in new NDCs. These initiatives provide an entry point for implementing action and enhanced international cooperation in 2024. Pursuant to the GST mandate, “enhancing international cooperation” will be crucial to move from zero sum confrontational negotiations and incremental increases in ambition and implementation, toward the transformational level and pace of change necessary to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement.
- **Push for COP28 to set out a clear plan for what will happen next** so all Parties, NPS and relevant international organizations are clear as to what is expected of them in 2024 to ensure an effective response to the COP28 and the GST. This could build on existing mandates and be driven by the COP28 Presidency. The TD-SYR informs Parties about potential areas for updating and enhancing their action and support, as well as for enhancing international cooperation for climate action. From this foundation, an effective 2024 response could usefully be informed by additional practical technical resources, such as policy pathways in key areas.

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<sup>2</sup> [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/COP28\\_Letter\\_July\\_2023\\_1.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/COP28_Letter_July_2023_1.pdf).



- **Ensure that the COP28 and GST outcomes are clearly linked to the process of submitting new NDCs in 2025.** Parties should be required to set out in their new NDCs how they intend to contribute to the achievement of any new global signals or targets agreed at COP28. In addition, Parties should strengthen their long-term low emission development strategies (*LT-LEDs*), national adaptation plans (*NAPs*), adaptation communications, and other relevant instruments as well as their ongoing actions and policies in light of the information and signals emerging from the GST and COP28, with a view to closing ambition and implementation gaps.
- **Increase the transparency and accountability of international cooperative initiatives, actions and voluntary commitments involving Parties, NPS and international organizations.** The UNFCCC's Global Climate Action Portal should be used more effectively to recognize effective action taken by NPS and drive greater ambition. Parties should include in their next NDCs domestic policies and regulations such as disclosure requirements (including on climate-related financial risk) and transition plans, so as to increase the transparency, credibility and ambition of NPS efforts.
- **Request the UN Secretary General to invite world leaders to submit their new NDCs on Earth Day in 2025,** creating a political backstop to the GST process that is consistent with the requirement to submit new NDCs at least nine months before COP30.

This submission builds on prior work and outreach by C2ES<sup>3</sup> that identifies key, specific, operational and transformative signals that could usefully be given by COP28 and the GST.<sup>4</sup> This submission focuses on a short list of key signals, elements of which could feature in the final GST decision or in other parts of the COP28 decision package.

While this submission broadly follows the indicative draft structure for GST1 CMA5 decision,<sup>5</sup> aspects of it could alternatively be included in other elements of the package of decisions to be adopted at CMA5.

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<sup>3</sup> This submission has benefited from inputs by Sebastian Oberthür, Vrije Universiteit Brussel and University of Eastern Finland; Laura Juliana Arciniegas, Transforma; Lavayna Rajamani, University of Oxford; Leila Pourarkin, Kaya Partners; and Andrew Higham, Plexus Strategy, among others.

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.c2es.org/document/a-solutions-oriented-approach-to-the-global-stocktake-technical-paper>.

<sup>5</sup> [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/IN.SBI58.i7\\_SBSTA58.i8.4.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/IN.SBI58.i7_SBSTA58.i8.4.pdf).



## A. Preamble

1. *Acknowledging* the urgent need to accelerate progress toward achieving the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement and the potential and wealth of opportunities available to transition towards low-emission and climate resilient societies and economies across relevant sectors and systems.<sup>6</sup>
2. *Recalling* Articles 2 and 14 of the Paris Agreement; decision 1/CP.21, paragraphs 99-101; decision 19/CMA.1; decision 1/CMA.3; decision 7/CMA.3; and other relevant Articles of the Paris Agreement and paragraphs of decision 1/CP.21.

## B. Context and cross-cutting considerations

3. *Welcomes* the synthesis report of the GST technical dialogue and **urges Parties to formulate new nationally determined contributions informed by its findings.**<sup>7</sup>
4. *Notes with grave concern* that according to the IPCC Synthesis Report of the Sixth Assessment Report, the “rapidly closing window of opportunity to secure a liveable and sustainable future for all,”<sup>8</sup> and recognizes that “the choices and actions implemented in this decade will have impacts now and for thousands of years.”<sup>9</sup>
5. *Agrees* that effectively addressing the climate challenge requires an all-of-economy and society approach and far-reaching transformation of key economic, political and societal systems, addressing specific gaps, barriers and enablers existing across these systems, guided by related specific goals.
6. *Welcomes* the report, “Synergy Solutions for a World in Crisis: Tackling Climate and SDG Action Together” and *agrees* on the need to pursue integrated, holistic, accelerated and equitable climate action with a view to harnessing synergies and reducing trade-offs with Sustainable Development Goals.<sup>10</sup>
7. *Emphasizes* that a three to six fold increase in the availability of and access to finance for adaptation, mitigation and averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage is required, in particular for developing countries.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> See [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023\\_09\\_adv.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023_09_adv.pdf); [https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6syrr/pdf/IPCC\\_AR6\\_SYR\\_LongerReport.pdf](https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6syrr/pdf/IPCC_AR6_SYR_LongerReport.pdf).

<sup>7</sup> [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023\\_09\\_adv.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023_09_adv.pdf).

<sup>8</sup> [https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6syrr/pdf/IPCC\\_AR6\\_SYR\\_LongerReport.pdf](https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6syrr/pdf/IPCC_AR6_SYR_LongerReport.pdf), p53.

<sup>9</sup> <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/resources/spm-headline-statements>.

<sup>10</sup> <https://sdgs.un.org/sites/default/files/2023-09/UN%20Climate%20SDG%20Synergies%20Report-091223B.pdf>.

<sup>11</sup> [https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/downloads/report/IPCC\\_AR6\\_WGIII\\_SummaryForPolicymakers.pdf](https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_SummaryForPolicymakers.pdf), p47.



8. *Recognizes* that the systems transformation necessary to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement must be implemented so as to limit painful disruption, be fair, equitable, human-rights focused, inclusive, driven by local context and constraints, and engage the full spectrum of stakeholders.

**C. Collective progress towards achieving the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, including under Article 2, paragraph 1 (a-c), in the light of equity and the best available science, and informing Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, action and support**

**C.1 Mitigation**

9. *Resolves* that new nationally determined contributions due to be submitted at least nine to twelve months in advance of COP30 shall be informed by the following considerations:
- (a) To stay within the 1.5°C limit of the Paris Agreement, new nationally determined contributions need to lead to rapid, deep and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions, including reducing global greenhouse gas emissions by 43 percent by 2030 and 60 percent by 2035 relative to the 2019 levels, and reach net zero CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by 2050 globally.
  - (b) New nationally determined contributions shall reflect highest possible ambition, each Party's fair share, and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.
  - (c) New nationally determined contributions must be consistent with a feasible and effective pathway toward achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions in line with the global emission reductions required, as referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above, that needs to be reflected in long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies under Article 4.19 of the Paris Agreement, taking into account different national circumstances.
  - (d) Countries in a position to do so should aim for net zero greenhouse gas emissions before 2050.
  - (e) Enhanced support for developing country Parties enables highest ambition and full and effective implementation of nationally determined contributions, in accordance with Article 4.5 of the Paris Agreement.
  - (f) In furtherance of Article 4.4 of the Paris Agreement, new nationally determined contributions shall contain economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets covering all greenhouse gasses (in line with most recent IPCC guidelines) in the light of different national circumstances, with greater flexibility for least developed countries and small island developing states.
  - (g) To facilitate their full implementation in accordance with Article 4.2 of the Paris Agreement, new nationally determined contributions shall include information on domestic mitigation measures to be taken to achieve their objectives, addressing key systems transformations.



10. *Recognizes* that pursuing domestic mitigation measures in accordance with Article 4.2 of the Paris Agreement requires Parties to establish and continuously develop effective and appropriate national climate policy frameworks, building on evolving best practice as reflected in IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (WG III, Ch. 13), taking into account different national circumstances.
11. *Resolves to enhance*, as a matter of urgency, domestic and international efforts to stay within the 1.5°C limit of the Paris Agreement, by advancing and accelerating the required transformation of key economic, political and societal systems, as acknowledged in the technical dialogue of the first global stocktake synthesis report by the co-facilitators on the technical dialogue. These shall, in particular, aim to:
- (a) Triple renewable energy capacity by 2030, including increasing the share of renewable energy sources in global electricity generation to at least two-thirds by 2030 with the aim of full decarbonization by 2050, while reducing the share of fossil sources.
  - (b) Reduce methane emissions from the fossil fuel sector by 75 percent by 2030.
  - (c) Halt and reverse land degradation as well as biodiversity & ecosystem loss, including in particular forest loss, by 2030.<sup>12</sup>
  - (d) Reach 75 percent of sales of zero-emission light-duty vehicles in leading markets by 2030 and 100 per cent by 2035.
  - (e) Reduce the carbon intensity of building operations, minimize embodied emissions, and increase the rate of building retrofits to 3.5 percent by 2040, aiming for all new and existing assets to be net zero across their life cycles by 2050.
12. *Further agrees* that each Party shall:
- (a) Include information in its new nationally determined contribution on how the nationally determined contribution is consistent with the considerations enumerated in paragraph 11 above; and
  - (b) Specify in its new nationally determined contribution its contribution to the global targets contained in paragraph 11 above.

## **C.2 Adaptation**

13. *Decides* that all Parties shall consider and implement the framework on the Global Goal on Adaptation adopted in (decision XX/CMA.5) at all levels of their adaptation processes.
14. *Agrees* that Parties and non-Party stakeholders should implement national adaptation plans, continuously improve adaptation planning, and take more transformative adaptation actions. Parties should consider the following approaches and best practice in their national and subnational planning and implementation processes:

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<sup>12</sup> This signal also has adaptation co-benefits.



- (a) Engaging in long-term, multi-sectoral, inclusive and just climate-resilient development pathways.
  - (b) Addressing multiple climate and socioeconomic scenarios.
  - (c) Harnessing synergies and reducing trade-offs between mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development and biodiversity objectives and targets.
  - (d) Integrating climate risk management, including climate-related disaster risk management.
  - (e) Assessing, when selecting relevant adaptation options, the local context and the local and global collective implications of those options.
  - (f) Addressing social inequities, justice and ecological vulnerabilities, including by giving appropriate consideration to gender, indigenous and local knowledge and practice.
  - (g) Considering the rights implications of climate impacts/loss and damage in planning and implementation.
15. *Agrees* that, in the context of enhancing the quality and effectiveness of adaptation planning and accelerating implementation while avoiding maladaptation, adequate support, both in terms of speed and scale, must be provided for developing countries to address their needs and priorities, including with regard to:
- (a) The production and availability of sufficient qualitative climate data and adequately downscaled climate projections necessary for: (i) iteratively assessing risks, vulnerabilities and adaptation and loss and damage needs; and (ii) monitoring and evaluating progress.
  - (b) Ensuring that climate risk and adaptation decision-making processes are participatory and inclusive.
  - (c) Establishing and enhancing monitoring, evaluation and learning systems.
  - (d) Mainstreaming adaptation into institutional budget and policy planning cycles, statutory planning, monitoring and evaluation frameworks and into recovery efforts from disaster events.
  - (e) Locally-led adaptation processes.
16. *Resolves to* enhance action and support for nature-based solutions, including as an essential complement to efforts to decarbonize the energy sector.<sup>13</sup>
17. *Reaffirms* the need to urgently scale up climate finance for adaptation in line with the Glasgow call to at least double the collective provision of adaptation finance from 2019 levels by 2025, in the context of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation in the provision of scaled-up financial resources, recalling Article 9, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement.

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<sup>13</sup> Conservation International, Environmental Defense Fund, and The Nature Conservancy, "Submission for the Information Collection and Preparation (ICP) Component of the Global Stocktake (GST)."



18. *Calls on* Parties to strengthen their support for the formulation and the implementation of national adaptation plans and adaptation communications of developing countries.
19. *Resolves* to intensify domestic and international efforts to reduce vulnerability, and increase adaptive capacity and resilience, by advancing and accelerating the required transformation of key economic, political and societal systems, as acknowledged in the technical dialogue of the first global stocktake synthesis report by the co-facilitators on the technical dialogue. These shall, in particular:
- (a) Focussing on those that are the most vulnerable to climate impacts, ensure that 50 percent of the global population is climate resilient by 2030, aspiring to 100 percent by 2050.
  - (b) Halt and reverse land degradation as well as biodiversity & ecosystem loss, including in particular forest loss, by 2030.<sup>14</sup>
  - (c) By 2030: (i) foster climate resilient, sustainable agriculture that increases yields by 17 percent and reduces farm level greenhouse gas emissions by 21 percent without expansion of the agricultural frontier; and (ii) halve, relative to 2019, the share of food production lost and per capita food waste, while shifting to more healthy and plant-based diets.
20. *Further agrees* that each Party shall include in its nationally determined contribution, national adaptation plan, adaptation communication or other relevant instruments as appropriate, information on its contribution to achieving the global targets in paragraph 19 above.

**C.3 [Alt 1-C.3 Finance flows and means of implementation and support/Alt 2-C.3 Means of implementation and support, including finance flows / Alt.3-C.3 Means of implementation and support / Alt.4-C.3 Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate resilient development]**

21. *Recognizes* that finance, technology, capacity-building and international cooperation are critical levers for enabling climate action.
22. *Reaffirms* the need for all Parties to take international and domestic action towards shifting finance flows to make them consistent with pathways towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate resilient development and *encourages* Parties to advance decisively in this direction, taking into consideration discussions under the Sharm el-Sheik Dialogue.
23. *Emphasizes* the continuing obligations of developed country Parties to provide and mobilize climate finance pursuant to Article 9 of the Paris Agreement.

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<sup>14</sup> This signal also has adaptation co-benefits.





24. *Highlights* the urgent need to provide capacity building support to developing country Parties to align financial flows with the goals of the Paris Agreement.
25. *Expresses serious concern* that the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly US \$100 billion per year by 2020 has not yet been achieved and *urges* developed country Parties to urgently accelerate their efforts in this regard.
26. *Calls* upon developed countries to report on the progress made towards, and make all efforts to deliver on, their goal to at least double adaptation finance against 2019 levels.
27. *Urges* developed country Parties and others in a position to do so, as well as investors, multilateral development banks and international financial institutions to scale up public and private finance and investment, particularly for low-carbon infrastructure as well decarbonization and resilience technologies, and support development of related policies and measures in developing countries.
28. *Resolves* to urgently close the existing gaps in means of implementation and support and financial flows guided by advancing and accelerating the required transformation of key economic, political and societal systems as acknowledged in the technical dialogue of the first global stocktake synthesis report by the co-facilitators on the technical dialogue. These efforts shall, in particular, aim to:
  - (a) At least triple the proportion of finance and investments in renewable energy by 2030 from Parties, multilateral development banks, and non-Party stakeholders - in particular international financial institutions.
  - (b) Urge bilateral, multilateral, and private creditors to design and implement mechanisms for debt payments suspension, restructuring, and cancellation as soon as possible and by 2030 at the latest, with a view to addressing climate-related needs.
  - (c) Urge multilateral development banks, international financial institutions, private and institutional investors, and corporate actors to revise and adjust their investment plans and portfolios to significantly increase their investments in decarbonization and resilience projects with the aim of reaching US \$4.5-5 trillion annually by 2030, including by mainstreaming disclosure and management of financial risks and opportunities and by aligning their financial resources with the long term goals of the Paris Agreement.
  - (d) Call upon multilateral development banks, international financial institutions, climate funds, and other multilateral and bilateral cooperation agencies to increase the share of grants and highly concessional instruments for developing countries, particularly for the design, implementation, and monitoring of adaptation action.
  - (e) Tie fossil fuel subsidies reform to broader economy-wide just transition plans, and provide support to developing countries to implement them.
  - (f) Increase capacity building support to developing countries to create the necessary enabling environments to operationalize Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement.



29. *Stresses* that the key findings identified in the technical dialogue of the first global stocktake synthesis report by the co-facilitators on the technical dialogue and the overall GST process must be considered in the negotiations of the new collective quantified goal to ensure it will respond effectively to the needs of developing countries, with emphasis on the provision of public and grant-based finance for adaptation and loss and damage and the mobilisation of private resources at scale and speed for mitigation, while ensuring quality, predictability, and additional climate finance.

#### **C.4 Efforts related to loss and damage**

30. *Acknowledges* that averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage requires urgent action through climate and development policies to reduce vulnerabilities, decrease exposure and comprehensively manage risks and to provide support to impacted communities.

31. *Agrees* to adopt comprehensive management approaches to minimize risks and to offer opportunities for transferring risk, including through climate risk pools and insurance programmes that internalize the risk and respond to possible impacts.

32. *Resolves* to urgently enhance action across climate and development policies and rapidly scale sources to meet increasing needs and provide support to impacted communities, guided by advancing and accelerating the required transformation of key economic, political and societal systems as acknowledged in the technical dialogue of the first global stocktake synthesis report by the co-facilitators on the technical dialogue. These efforts shall, in particular, aim to:

(a) Significantly increase by 2030 the capacity and resources of developing countries, with a focus on those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, to avert, minimize, and address loss and damage, including at the local, national, regional, and international level.

(b) Ensure, by 2027, universal coverage of early warning systems, connected to longer-term risk management systems, and supported by effective risk communication and public stakeholder dialogue to prompt informed action, and by 2030 universal coverage of climate services in priority climate-sensitive sectors (agriculture and food security, health, disaster risk reduction, energy, and water).

33. *Calls* upon Parties to indicate in their new nationally determined contributions or otherwise how they intend to take these efforts forward.

34. *Welcomes* the decision [XXXX] to further implement operationalization of the loss and damage fund and funding arrangements.



## C.5 Efforts related to response measures

35. *Recalls* the preamble of the Paris Agreement, noting just transition as a guiding principle in the implementation of the Agreement and urging Parties to “take into account the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined development priorities.”<sup>15</sup>
36. *Recalls* the Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan, further affirming that “the global transition to low emissions provides opportunities and challenges for sustainable economic development and poverty eradication,”<sup>16</sup> and that in the context of a just and equitable transition, such “pathways that include energy, socioeconomic, workforce, and other dimensions ... must be based on nationally defined development priorities and include social protection.”<sup>17</sup>
37. *Emphasizes* the importance of ensuring just transition to net zero greenhouse gas emission and negative emission societies by providing support to enable Parties to do so.
38. *Welcomes* decision [XXXX] on the Work Programme on Just Transition to discuss pathways to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement, noting that it builds on the work of the Forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures and its Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures.
39. *Emphasizes* that Parties and non-Party stakeholders should diversify to address the impacts of response measures, and that such approaches can promote positive synergies within long-term low emission development strategies. Opportunities for such diversification include green industrialization, the greening of supply chains, and diversifying to related and unrelated products.

## D. Enhancing international cooperation for climate action

40. *Emphasizes* that achieving the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement requires enhancing international cooperation, as appropriate, between: the UNFCCC; the broader United Nations system; other international organisations and agreements, specifically including enhanced efforts under the International Civil Aviation Organization and International Maritime Organisation to address emissions from international transport; the global financial system; and various international cooperative initiatives involving Parties or non-Party stakeholders.

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<sup>15</sup> UNFCCC, “Paris Agreement,” preamble, [https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2016/02/20160215%2006-03%20PM/Ch\\_XXVII-7-d.pdf](https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2016/02/20160215%2006-03%20PM/Ch_XXVII-7-d.pdf).

<sup>16</sup> UNFCCC, Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan, Decision 1/CMA.4, ¶ 50, [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2022\\_10a01\\_adv.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2022_10a01_adv.pdf) [hereinafter Sharm el-Sheik Implementation Plan].

<sup>17</sup> Sharm el-Sheik Implementation Plan, ¶ 51.



41. *Welcomes* progress made in the context of the Marrakech Partnership and by the High Level Climate Champions, including through the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action platform, the Race to Zero, the Race to Resilience and the Breakthrough Agenda, and specifically in ensuring greater accountability of international cooperative initiatives and activities of non-Party stakeholders.
42. *Urges* Parties and non-Party stakeholders to take into consideration the work of the High Level Climate Champions and the Marrakech Partnership, as appropriate, including in the formulation and implementation of new and more ambitious nationally determined contributions.
43. *Encourages* Parties, non-Party stakeholders, the secretariat and the High Level Climate Champions, in cooperation with the COP28 and COP29 Presidencies, the Marrakech Partnership and others, as appropriate, to urgently enhance international cooperation on climate change in the broader United Nations system, other international organisations and agreements, the global financial system and various international cooperative initiatives.
44. *Agrees* that such efforts at enhancing international cooperation should include a focus on delivering the global targets contained in paragraphs 11 (mitigation), 19 (adaptation), 28 (means of implementation), and 32 (loss and damage).
45. *Emphasises* the importance of ensuring accountability and transparency of all international cooperation on climate change and encourages taking forward recent initiatives to further enhance accountability and transparency (*reference to Recognition and Accountability Framework under Marrakech Partnership*).

## **E. Guidance and way forward**

46. *Agrees* that pathways and roadmaps for required systems transformations can provide essential guidance for enhancing climate action toward achieving the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement.
47. *Decides* that the implementation of the Paris Agreement shall be accelerated immediately and as a matter of urgency throughout 2024, with a focus on realising the outcomes of COP28 and the GST and specifically the targets identified in paragraphs paragraphs 11 (mitigation), 19 (adaptation), 28 (means of implementation), and 32 (loss and damage) above, including through:
  - (a) Parties preparing and communicating new nationally determined contributions nine to twelve months in advance of COP30;
  - (b) Parties and non-Party stakeholders enhancing international cooperation, including in international cooperative initiatives;
  - (c) Relevant international organizations and agreements maximising their efforts.



48. *Invites* Parties, non-Party stakeholders and relevant international organizations to report on progress on enhancing international cooperation for climate action at COP29, including through the Marrakech Partnership and the work of the High Level Climate Champions, as appropriate.
49. *Invites* the COP28 and COP29 Presidencies to convene, in collaboration with the High Level Climate Champions, a series of meetings in 2024 at the political and technical levels, to enhance international cooperation in taking forward the outcomes of COP28 and the GST, including those highlighted in paragraphs paragraphs 11 (mitigation), 19 (adaptation), 28 (means of implementation), and 32 (loss and damage) above, and to report back on progress at COP29.
50. *Invites* the Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies to translate the outcomes of COP28 and the GST into specific deliverables set to timetables, and report back on progress towards achieving the outcomes of COP28 and the GST, including those highlighted in paragraphs paragraphs 11 (mitigation), 19 (adaptation), 28 (means of implementation), and 32 (loss and damage) above, in the relevant work programmes and processes under UNFCCC and Paris Agreement, including:
- (a) Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme (MWP).
  - (b) ad hoc work programme on the NCQG on finance.
  - (c) Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue to exchange views on and enhance understanding of the scope of Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement.
  - (d) further work on the [placeholder for the name of the adopted global goal on adaptation (GGA)].
  - (e) Work Programme on Just Transition to discuss pathways to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement.
  - (f) Work of loss and damage mechanisms and bodies (including the Warsaw International Mechanism, the Santiago Network, the loss and damage fund and funding arrangements).
51. *Requests* the UN Secretary General to invite world leaders to submit their new nationally determined contributions at a special event to be convened on Earth Day 2025.