

# Global Carbon Budget 2016

The work presented here has been possible thanks to the enormous observational and modelling efforts of the institutions and networks below

## Atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> datasets

NOAA/ESRL (Dlugokencky and Tans 2016)  
Scripps (Keeling et al. 1976)

## Fossil Fuels and Industry

CDIAC (Boden et al. 2016)  
USGS, 2016  
UNFCCC, 2016  
BP, 2016

## Consumption Emission

Peters et al. 2011  
GTAP (Narayanan et al. 2015)

## Land-Use Change

Houghton et al. 2012  
GFED4 (van der Werf et al. 2010)  
FAO-FRA and FAOSTAT  
HYDE (Klein Goldewijk et al. 2011)

## Atmospheric inversions

CarbonTracker (Peters et al. 2010)  
Jena CarboScope (Rödenbeck et al. 2003)  
MACC (Chevallier et al. 2005)

## Land models

CABLE-POP | CLASS-CTEM | CLM4.5BGC | DLEM |  
ISAM | JSBACH | JULES | LPJ-GUESS | LPJ | LPX |  
OCNv2 | ORCHIDEE | SDGVM | VISIT  
CRU (Harris et al. 2014)

## Ocean models

NEMO-PlankTOM5 | NEMO-PISCES (IPSL) | CCSM-BEC  
| MICOM-HAMMOC | NEMO-PISCES (CNRM) | CSIRO  
| MITgem-REcoM2  
SOCATv4 (Bakker et al. 2016)


## Ocean Data products

Jena CarboScope (Rödenbeck et al. 2014)  
Landschützer et al. 2015

Full references provided in [Le Quéré et al 2016](#)

# Global carbon budget

The carbon sources from fossil fuels, industry, and land use change emissions are balanced by the atmosphere and carbon sinks on land and in the ocean




# Fossil Fuel and Industry Emissions

# Emissions from fossil fuel use and industry

Global emissions from fossil fuel and industry:  $36.3 \pm 1.8$  GtCO<sub>2</sub> in 2015, 63% over 1990


- Projection for 2016:  $36.4 \pm 2.3$  GtCO<sub>2</sub>, 0.2% higher than 2015



Uncertainty is  $\pm 5\%$  for one standard deviation (IPCC “likely” range)

# Top emitters: fossil fuels and industry (absolute)

The top four emitters in 2015 covered 59% of global emissions  
 China (29%), United States (15%), EU28 (10%), India (6%)




Bunker fuels are used for international transport is 3.1% of global emissions.

Statistical differences are between the global estimates and sum of national totals is 1.2% of global emissions.

Source: [CDIAC](#); [Le Quéré et al 2016](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2016](#)

# Top emitters: fossil fuels and industry (per capita)

Countries have a broad range of per capita emissions reflecting their national circumstances




# Land-use Change Emissions



# Land-use change emissions

Emissions in the 2000s were lower than earlier decades, but highly uncertain  
 Higher emissions in 2015 are linked to increased fires during dry El Niño conditions in Asia



Global Carbon Project


Three different estimation methods have been used, indicated here by different shades of grey

Land-use change also emits CH<sub>4</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>O which are not shown here

Source: [Houghton et al 2012](#); [Giglio et al 2013](#); [Le Quéré et al 2016](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2016](#)

# Total global emissions by source

Land-use change was the dominant source of annual CO<sub>2</sub> emissions until around 1950





Others: Emissions from cement production and gas flaring

Source: [CDIAC](#); [Houghton et al 2012](#); [Giglio et al 2013](#); [Le Quéré et al 2016](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2016](#)

# Atmospheric Concentration

# Atmospheric concentration


The global CO<sub>2</sub> concentration increased from ~277ppm in 1750 to 399ppm in 2015 (up 44%)  
 2016 will be the first full year with concentration above 400ppm



# The Future

# Observed emissions and emissions scenarios

Joeri, add a figure. Perhaps EGR?



Over 1000 scenarios from the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report are shown


Source: [Fuss et al 2014](#); [CDIAC](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2015](#)

# Going into “debt” with negative emissions

*Sabine Fuss, MCC-Berlin*

# Negative emissions required for 2°C


To achieve net-negative emissions globally after 2050 requires deployment as early as 2020-2030  
 If negative emission technologies do not work at scale, society is locked into higher temperatures






# The future

The emission pledges to the Paris Agreement avoid the worst effects of climate change (4-5°C)  
Most studies suggest the pledges give a likely temperature increase of about 3°C in 2100



In the lead up to the IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report new scenarios have been developed to more systematically explore key uncertainties in future socioeconomic developments



Five Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) have been developed to explore challenges to adaptation and mitigation. Shared Policy Assumptions (SPAs) are used to achieve target forcing levels (W/m<sup>2</sup>).

Source: [Riahi et al. 2016](#); [IIASA SSP Database](#); [Global Carbon Budget 2016](#)

- Global fossil fuel and industry CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are nearly flat for third year in a row, driven primarily by China
- It is possible that the trajectory of global emissions has permanently deviated from the long-term growth trend
- Record growth in atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> in spite of flat emissions due to weak carbon sinks, driven by El Niño
- Many alternative pathways to 1.5°C and 2°C
  - *Joeri Rogelj*: Remaining CO<sub>2</sub> quota has reduced another 40GtCO<sub>2</sub> and significant gap between emission pledges and 2°C pathways
  - *Sabine Fuss*: Emissions need to go to zero, and this will require the use of negative emissions
  - *Alice Larkin*: Insufficient mitigation in some sectors (aviation and shipping) mean more mitigation and negative emission in others