Financial incentives to combat climate change and benefit the rural poor

Brent Swallow World Agroforestry Centre, Nairobi, Kenya For IFAD-funded RUPES and PRESA projects









Side Event COP 14, Climate հիգոցե Mitigation₃ Potential of Agriculture Poznan, Wednesday 3 December 20008, Fox Room 13:00 – 15:00.





FIGURE 7 Barriers to the adoption of improved management practices: permanent decrease in farm income



Source: FA/O, 2007c.





FIGURE 8 Barriers to the adoption of improved management practices: information and investment constraints



Source: FAO, 2007c.





RUPES – Rewards for, Use of and Shared Investment in Pro-poor Environmental Services (Phase-II)

- A. National policy framework
- B. International and national buyer and investor engagement
- C. Environmental service intermediaries enabled
- D. Innovations in effective, efficient and pro-poor RES mechanisms
- E. Mainstream RES into IFAD rural development initiatives

PRESA: Propoor Rewards for Environmental Services in Africa


Objectives:

- 1. Foster workable environmental service agreements.
- 2. Catalyze policy support and private-sector participation in environmental service agreements
- 3. Provide support to researchers, NGOs and government agencies interested in propoor rewards for environmental services in Africa










PRESA Sites



- Biodiversity conservation
- Carbon management (farm and landscape)

Bac Kan - Vietnam

- Vietnamese Government's strong commitment to the Global Agenda 21 and its inclusion of PES
- Pilot activities in 3 districts in Bac Kan Province







Constraints of PES implementation in Vietnam

At macro / national level:

- Organizational limitations:
 - Overlapping government structures and functions
 - Top-down planning and control
 - Lack of coordination and high transaction costs
- Institutional limitations:
 - Lack of specific regulations for PES
 - Low involvement by the poor in planning and decision making
 - Insecure land tenure
- Public service capacity
 - Poor understanding of pro-poor PES
 - Lack of technical methods and skills







Constraints of PES implementation in Vietnam

At micro level:

- Limited understanding on environmental and PES issues
- Lack capacity of local authorities in developing, managing and monitoring PES
- Low responsibility of private sectors and communities toward ES protection
- Unclear direction from the Central Government
- Weak administrative and financial decentralization
- Difficulty in implementing (especially) 'voluntary' and 'conditionality' criteria of PES
- Lack incentives for local authority to implement PES

B Swallow FAC







Forestry / agriculture carbon projects in Africa

- 23 projects documented across 14 countries (mix of forestry only, agroforestry, agriculture).
- Total sequestration potential is 26.85 million tCO₂
- East Africa had the largest proportion with 9 projects.
- Other prominent countries South Africa,
 Mozambique, Senegal, Mali.

Source: R. Jindal, B. Swallow and J. Kerr, Natural Resources

Forum, 2008.

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Dec 2008

Main characteristics

- Most projects sell carbon offsets in voluntary markets (Biocarbon Fund, TIST, Uganda)
- Others started as research initiatives (Carbon from communities, Mali)
- Some combine sequestration activities with avoided deforestation (Nhambita project, Mozambique)

Major lessons

- □ Can reduce poverty (eg. additional income up to \$100/ household / year; access to sustainable practices and diverse income sources; potential for more secure land rights) but more evidence needed.
- Spillovers can be:
 - +ve (biodiversity conservation) or,
 - -ve (fall in water table due to fast growing exotics).
 - → Careful selection of site and species required
- □ Land users may lose access if property rights are not secure (esp., 143

Scaling up?

- Africa still represents a small proportion of global carbon credits:
 - →more investments needed from multilateral agencies
- High monitoring and contractual costs of working with smallholders:
 - →need to reduce transaction costs
- Building institutional capacity at the:
 - national level to identify priorities, and
 - local level to design and implement pro-poor projects
- Good governance: strong determinant of growth in long-term carbon investments

Main conclusions:

- Potential for smallholder agriculture / forestry to be more productive, more sustainable and emit less GHGs
- Financial incentives -- often combined with market, extension, and land tenure interventions
 -- can help meet this challenge
- Developed countries experiences, voluntary carbon markets and international organizations are main sources of innovation

Implications for carbon finance in UNFCCC

- Programmatic CDM and REDD could help to mobilize and deliver finance
- REDD which focuses on forest / non-forest definitions detract from understanding of the potential of farmers as emitters / sequesters of carbon
- Need for a full-landscape approach to carbon accounting and context-specific approaches to implementation (eg combination of subsidies, taxes, tenure, conditional payments)
- Need for containing transaction costs eg methods for Annex 1 C-accounting approaches

http: presa.worldagroforestry.org
www.worldagroforestry.org/sea/networks/rupes