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Standards for REDD+ Economic Mechanisms

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Terrestrial GHGs and Climate Mitigation:
Developments in Science, Economics, & Policy
UN FCCC Conference of Parties 16 Side event

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There are many economic mechanisms for REDD+


The focus here is on the carbon offset market





Forest Carbon Credit Chain of Custody

Credit Flow





Why standards?

- **Buyers** – need to know what they are buying
- **Sellers** – need to know what to sell
- **Overseers** – need to know that
 - An offset is an offset – reductions are real, permanent, and verifiable
 - Basic protections are upheld (environmental, social, governance, transparency,...)





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Many different standards


Current



CLIMATE
ACTION
RESERVE



Potential





REDD+ standards need to wrestle with numerous complex issues






Who owns the Rights?





Measurement and Monitoring



Landsat, 1990

Landsat, 2000



Additionality

With project



globalcarbonproject.org

Without project



Mongabay.com

Or...



?






Leakage



Avoid Deforestation for agriculture
in one place



Deforestation
elsewhere for agriculture





(Im)permanence



Avoid Deforestation in Year 0



Deforestation delayed to Yr 5

Receive credits



Replace credits?

Time






How current standards deal with these issues

Issue	Approaches
Rights and benefits sharing	Legal and consultative requirements
Measurement and Monitoring	Technical requirements (tiered)
Additionality	Discrete additionality tests (legal, financial,...) Project baseline
Leakage	Local monitoring Estimation of market leakage
Permanence	Liability establishment (buyer, seller) Management provisions <ul style="list-style-type: none">- financial guarantees/insurance- setback requirements (buffers)



From the project to the jurisdictional level

- Voluntary market to date has focused on project level
- Kyoto Protocol/CDM rejected project-level REDD for many of the problems referenced above
- Current policy movement is toward jurisdictional accounting
 - UNFCCC: national
 - California: state
 - US (erstwhile) legislation – state -> national
 - Why?
 - Deals better with problems above, especially intrajurisdictional leakage





This doesn't mean the end of projects

- Top-down projects from the government
 - Projects are ~ subcontracts
 - Government takes responsibility for aggregate performance
- “Nested” projects
 - Finance still flows directly to subnational projects (not all through government)
 - Rationale: Investors prefer to deal with projects not governments
 - Project accounting must be reconciled with national accounting
 - Problems
 - Complicated
 - Risky: possibility of project losing credits because of extramural performance





Recent Developments

- **Voluntary markets**

- Many REDD methodologies under review/approval by VCS, CAR, ACR,...
- Independent initiatives

- **Compliance markets**

- California – first compliance market for REDD anywhere
 - State-level accounting – Brazil, Mexico
- US – stalled legislation has held back what would have been world's largest compliance market
- UNFCCC – we shall see

- **Different vehicles**

- Conventional government funds
- Corporate Social Responsibility efforts/supply chain





Emerging Topic

policy brief




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Payments for Blue Carbon Potential for Protecting Threatened Coastal Habitats

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Coastal habitats worldwide are under increasing threat of destruction through human activities such as farming, aquaculture, timber extraction, or real estate development. This loss of habitat carries with it the loss of critical functions that coastal ecosystems provide: support of marine species, retention of shorelines, water quality, and scenic beauty, to name a few. These losses are large from an ecological standpoint but they are economically significant as well.² Because the value of these ecosystem services are not easily captured in markets, those who control these lands often do not consider these values when choosing whether to clear the habitat to produce goods that can be sold in the marketplace. This is a form of market failure that leads to excessive habitat destruction. As a result, scientists, policymakers, and other concerned parties are seeking ways to change economic incentives to correct the problem.

Figure 1. Global distribution of seagrass, salt marsh, and mangroves.



Sources: Salt marsh (version 1.0) of the provisional global point dataset developed jointly by UNEP-WCMC and ITC. This dataset is incomplete. Mangroves (version 3.2) of the global polygon dataset compiled by UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC) in collaboration with the International Society for Mangrove Ecosystems (ISME), 1997. For further information, e-mail spatialanalyst@unep-wcmc.org. Mangroves of Western Central Africa are data processed from Landsat imagery circa 2000. Compiled by UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC), 2006. For further information, e-mail spatialanalyst@unep-wcmc.org. East African mangroves are data from version 4.0 of the polygon dataset compiled by UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC), 2006. For further information, e-mail spatialanalyst@unep-wcmc.org. Seagrasses (version 2.0) of the global polygon and point dataset compiled by UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC), 2005. For further information, e-mail spatialanalyst@unep-wcmc.org.