

# Sectoral approaches: panacea or dead-end street?

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#### Sectoral mechanisms

- Proposed as a solution for scaling up the CDM
- Would simplify calculation of emission reductions and additionality determination
- Should reduce possibilities for gaming with baseline setting
- On the table:
  - Sectoral trading
  - Sectoral crediting
  - Sectoral NAMAs



## Sectoral trading

- Host country defines sectoral target
  - Reviewed & approved by COP
  - Substantially below BAU, absolute target
  - Covers all / the largest entities/installations within sectors
- Allocation of emission allowances to countries according to target
- Country implements national policies/NAMAs
  - May include national ETS (but: markets maybe too small!)
- Country can buy and sell in IET



## Sectoral trading

#### Problems

- No incentive for private industry to invest or to transfer technology
- System would suffer from time needed to approve required legislation & possible lack of enforcement
- Proposed solutions
  - Define a clear revenue split between governments and companies of covered sectors, e.g. 10-90
    - Direct incentive for national/international private investment
    - But: requires installation specific monitoring
  - Allow direct IET participation of companies



## Sectoral trading - industry

- Voluntary decision by government
- Absolute emission targets on installation level
- Mandatorily covers "all" installations within sector to avoid intra-sectoral carbon leakage (but: de-minimis approach)
- Allocation of allowances to all installations
- All installations can trade with each other and internationally
  - Access to international carbon market directly or via public "aggregators"



#### Sectoral trading: pro + con

- Clear price signal to plant operators (industry system only)
- Allows fast transition to national emissions trading
- Only sensible for sectors with medium-large number of large emissions sources
  - Too few sources: No liquidity
- Inter- and intrasectoral leakage possible
- Target approval is cumbersome
- High data requirements



## Sectoral crediting

- Host country defines sectoral baseline
  - to be reviewed & approved by COP / intern. body
  - substantially below BAU, absolute / intensity based
- Country implements national policies / NAMAs
- Credits may be issued for sectoral emissions reductions
  - ex-post crediting
  - no-lose target
- Supervision by COP / "a body"
- Rules wide open



## Sectoral crediting: pro+con

- Can use both absolute or intensity targets
- Government can use many different policy instruments
- Risk of hot air due to ex-ante target negotiations
- How are data collected?
- How is the incentive transmitted to the owners of installations?
- Requires efficient and unbiased host country government



## **NAMA** crediting

- Regulation
  - Efficiency standards
  - Technology mandate
- Subsidy
  - Feed-in-tariff
  - Investment support
  - R&D support
- Emission tax
- Information instruments
  - Labels

Remember rejection of policy CDM at 2005 COP!



#### NAMA crediting: pro+con

- Government can use many different policy instruments – decides on most effective approach
- Not all policy effects are verifiable
- Additionality determination is tricky what to do with side benefits (externalities)?
- MRVability
- Same incentive / governance problems as with sectoral crediting



#### Panacea or dead-end street?



- Baseline / cap setting
  - Data quality and availability
  - One-time decision for the whole compliance / crediting period
  - High uncertainty in future projections
    - Intensity-based?!
- Host country regulatory context
  - Domestic market mechanisms viable?
  - Correct / sufficient incentives for companies
- Monitoring and verification
  - Too many installations costs!
  - Confidentiality issues
  - Institutional capacity



#### Panacea or dead-end street?



- Sector definition / boundary
  - Small installations (India, China...)
  - Large installations are frequently world class already
  - Very different technologies / efficiency levels
    - Complexity versus inclusion
- Trading when there are too few installations / companies



## Options "à la carte"?

- Rational decision might be high flexibility
  - Allow an "à la carte" choice of mechanisms
    - Retain the CDM where it has been successful
    - Introduce sectoral / NAMA crediting in sectors with many dispersed sources but strong emissions growth



- Double counting needs to be prevented
  - Fungibility with CDM could be solved similarly as in JI



#### Options "à la carte"?

- Rational decision might be high flexibility
  - Private large industrial emitters: CDM
  - Public large industrial emitters: sectoral crediting
  - Large, consolidated, homogeneous industrial sectors: sectoral trading
  - Large housing estate developers: CDM
  - Small house owners: NAMA crediting



## Thank you for your attention!

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## Sectoral trading



