



Climate Change and Migration

Study Team on Climate-Induced Migration

June 2010

Summary: Diverse and dynamic patterns of internal and cross-border mobility, migration and displacement are the norm in most countries affected by chronic or recurrent humanitarian crises, which often makes it difficult to distinguish between forced and voluntary migrants because different people adopt highly varied strategies to cope or survive, or to respond to new opportunities. The most negative human impacts of climate change will be reflected in sudden and large-scale forced migration.

Many so-called “fragile states” already fail to provide adequate social protection to poor and vulnerable populations, so any climate-related deterioration in human security has the potential to generate extreme welfare needs that are far beyond the capacities or willingness of these states to address. The sheer scale and complexities of displacement will continue to stretch and challenge the normative, institutional and operational frameworks and capacities of the international humanitarian system and national humanitarian actors. Greater priority needs to be given to flexible humanitarian funding and programming suited to addressing chronic as well as acute humanitarian needs and vulnerability in countries where formal climate change adaptation policies are unlikely to be developed. Superficial climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction efforts in countries affected by complex and interacting processes including population growth, economic stagnation, conflict, urbanization and environmental stress, are unlikely to influence the deeper dynamics of vulnerability associated with distress migration.

Developing Adequate Humanitarian Responses

by Sarah Collinson

John Holmes, the United Nations (UN) Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, has described recent climate-related humanitarian disasters as a “curtain raiser on the future,” signifying what he terms a “new normal,”¹ reflected in a doubling of recorded humanitarian disasters over the past two decades, most of which have been hydrological, meteorological or climatological in nature.² Climate change is likely to add a further complex dynamic to the drivers of social, economic and political crisis and significantly accelerate an escalation of humanitarian need in many contexts. It will interact at every level with other key trends affecting humanitarian caseloads, including conflict, chronic poverty, poor governance, population growth, food insecurity, pressure on land and urbanization; the associated risks of these interacting trends are growing concurrently, particularly in countries with little in the way of state-supported social protection. The risks of humanitarian disasters are therefore set to increase not only as a consequence of more frequent and intense hazard events connected

with climate change, such as floods and droughts, but also as a result of escalating vulnerability to these hazards.³

With many precarious livelihood systems facing multiple stresses or destruction as a consequence of slow- and sudden-onset disasters and broader social and economic transformations, the ability of many millions of people to adapt and survive – to escape danger, to find food, shelter or sanctuary, or to secure a livelihood – will continue to depend to a greater or lesser extent on their own coping and survival strategies, including migration, and often on access to humanitarian assistance. The most negative human impacts of these interacting trends will continue to be reflected in patterns of sudden and longer-term forced migration.

Climate change thus simultaneously represents a “threat multiplier” in terms of its impacts on human vulnerability,⁴ a “demand multiplier” in its likely impacts on humanitarian needs and the consequent pressures on the international humanitarian system,

¹ John Holmes, “The need for collaboration,” *Forced Migration Review*, Issue 31, October 2008: 4.

² Ibid. and Informal Taskforce on Climate Change of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, “Disaster risk reduction strategies and risk management practices: critical elements for adaptation to climate change,” Submission to the UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action, November 11, 2008.

³ Informal Taskforce of the IASC et al., *op cit*.

and a “scale and complexity multiplier” in its associated impacts on migration, including forced migration.

Dynamics of humanitarian vulnerability in the face of climate change: implications for migration

The migration implications of climate change will be intimately connected with the complex interactions of climate change with broader causes and dynamics of human vulnerability across different countries and social groups, and over time. A number of important observations relating to these interactions deserve particular attention.

First, *national governance structures and the state’s capacity to provide services and maintain institutions are of key importance in influencing the humanitarian impacts of climate change and associated forced and voluntary migration in different contexts.* If drought leads to failure in food production, for example, the response (or not) of government and other power-holders will largely define whether this leads to severe food insecurity, violent struggle for control of contested resources, or large-scale forced or voluntary migration.

Many developing and middle-income countries that have experienced multiple and recurrent climate-related and other natural disasters and associated mass displacement have the institutional, logistical and financial resources to lead and implement effective humanitarian responses without calling for significant international assistance. Sometimes, however, a government’s willingness to request or allow international help is determined more by political sensitivities and imperatives than by actual response capacities and humanitarian needs on the ground. Governments may be reluctant to declare a disaster for fear of appearing weak, they may mistrust the motivations behind the provision of international assistance, or they may fear that international actors will usurp their role and challenge their sovereignty. The Myanmar government, for instance, was reluctant to call for international assistance after Cyclone Nargis in 2008, and both the Mozambique and Pakistan governments resisted international assistance following floods in 2007; China has faced numerous major

natural disasters but the government has rarely sought or accepted international assistance, and international engagement has been closely managed and regulated.⁵

People will continue to be most exposed to the risks of climate change and other stresses where formal governance institutions are particularly weak or distorted, especially where violence and poor governance have already weakened their coping and survival capacities. Many so-called “fragile states” already lack legitimacy and fail to provide adequate social protection to poor and vulnerable populations, so any climate-related deterioration in human security has the potential to generate extreme welfare needs that are far beyond the capacities or willingness of these states to address. These state capacities may themselves be directly undermined by the broader economic and other impacts of climate change, further impeding the provision of even minimal basic services or any state support of livelihoods.⁶ These trends may then create or exacerbate social and political tensions or violence, further threatening the welfare of communities that are already vulnerable to climatic and other shocks and hazards. While there is no way of predicting precisely how climate change might affect conflict dynamics, there is little doubt that any substantially negative impacts on livelihood security and state effectiveness in fragile states hold the potential to trigger or amplify violence that, in turn, is likely to cause displacement.⁷

Second, *diverse and complex patterns of internal and cross-border mobility, migration and displacement are the norm in most countries affected by chronic or recurrent humanitarian crises.* Indeed, in most situations of extreme vulnerability, it is difficult to distinguish forced and voluntary migration as different people adopt highly varied and dynamic strategies to survive or minimize livelihood risks, or to respond to new opportunities associated with changing circumstances. In most poor countries, many people and households pursue livelihoods through economic and social relationships that straddle urban and rural spaces with a variety of strategies and activities, including subsistence farming, pastoralism, cash-cropping, agricultural wage labor, house-building, petty trade, petty manufacture, transport and other wage labor. Many of these activities depend to a greater or lesser

⁴ Jenty Kirsch-Wood, Jacob Korreborg and Anne-Marie Linde, “What humanitarians need to do,” *Forced Migration Review*, Issue 31, October 2008: 40-41.

⁵ Paul Harvey, *Towards Good Humanitarian Government: The Role of the Affected State in Disaster Response*, HPG Report 29, Humanitarian Policy Group (Overseas Development Institute, London), 2009.

⁶ Jon Barnett and W. Neil Adger, “Climate change, human security and violent conflict,” *Political Geography*, 26 (2007): 639-655.

⁷ Ibid.

extent on temporary, cyclical or permanent migration. If unsuccessful, some livelihood strategies may lead eventually to displacement.⁸ People's livelihoods and other coping or survival strategies will often be negative in some respects, either for themselves (e.g. associated with asset depletion or exposure to new risks) or others (e.g. violent, criminal or exploitative livelihoods or protection strategies).⁹

Third, *deeper processes of marginalization, disempowerment, impoverishment or displacement may make some people or groups particularly vulnerable in many countries.* Relationships between different economic and political actors seeking livelihoods at different levels involve complex mixes of exploitation, exclusion, coercion and redistribution.¹⁰ A recent Overseas Development Institute (ODI) report on responses to drought in Ethiopia, for example, observes that while vulnerability to food insecurity may be caused most immediately by factors such as land degradation, recurrent drought, population pressure and low agricultural productivity, there is evidence that the impacts of these problems on food security are underpinned by economic, social and political dynamics of vulnerability. Marginalized populations, for instance, may have no access to basic services, knowledge and infrastructure to have any effective command over basic necessities and rights (e.g. failure to protect land rights).¹¹ These processes directly affect migration dynamics and outcomes. For example, shifting power dynamics between social and political groups, reflected in land-grabbing and other forms of asset-stripping or exclusion from key markets, may exacerbate or amplify climate-related threats to people's lives and livelihoods and interact with interconnected migration or displacement dynamics. Thus it may not be a straightforward issue of people losing farming land or being unable to grow crops because of drought: food insecurity or famine may be intentionally manipulated by power-holders, and this in turn may result in migration due to changed or disrupted livelihoods and/or displacement.¹²

Fourth, *context-specific vulnerability dynamics translate into pockets of humanitarian need or larger-scale crises to which national government and/or humanitarian actors may not be able or willing to respond effectively.* Where levels of human insecurity are particularly high and state capacity and resources weak, international humanitarian responses have a potentially very important part to play in affecting the patterns, significance and impacts of migration, and vice-versa. Where interventions have supported or accelerated urban development and/or impacted unevenly on rural poverty and vulnerability, for example, associated rural-urban migration and growth of urban populations may have contributed to the growth of ever-larger and possibly ever-more vulnerable urban populations exposed to climate-related hazards, such as floods or depleted food supplies affecting food prices and access to food. Already, around two-thirds of the world's mega-cities with populations greater than five million fall at least partly in low-lying flood-prone areas; possibly a fifth of the urban populations of the poorest countries live in hazard-prone environments.¹³ In most situations of large-scale Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and refugee return, both government and international humanitarian actors play a critical role in determining the rate and dynamics of people's movement and recovery of livelihoods in return areas; environmental hazards or stress aggravated by climate change have the potential to significantly impede prospects of successful or sustainable return of large displaced populations, particularly where drought, flood or weather variations associated with climate change may negatively affect people's livelihoods and food security.¹⁴

The responsiveness of the international humanitarian system to climate change and associated migration

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee's (IASC) Informal Taskforce on Climate Change has argued recently that adapting to climate change for humanitarian actors will

⁸ Philippa Bevan, "Conceptualising in/security regimes," in Ian Gough and Geof Wood with A. Barrientos, P. Bevan, P. Davis and G. Room (Eds), *Insecurity and Welfare Regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America*, Cambridge University Press (Social Policy in Development Contexts), Cambridge: 2004.

⁹ Sarah Collinson (Ed.) (2003) *Power, Livelihoods and Conflict: Case Studies in Political Economy Analysis for Humanitarian Action*, HPG Report 13, London: Overseas Development Institute (Humanitarian Policy Group).

¹⁰ Bevan, *op cit.*, pp.98-99.

¹¹ Sara Pantuliano and Mike Wekesa, "Improving drought response in pastoral areas of Ethiopia: Somali and Afar Regions and Borena Zone of Oromiya Region," Humanitarian Policy Group (Overseas Development Institute, London). Prepared for the CORE group (CARE, FAO, Save the Children UK and Save the Children US), January 2008: 10.

¹² See, e.g., David Keen (1994) *The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983–1989*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

¹³ Informal Taskforce of the IASC et al., *op cit.*

¹⁴ David Stone, "Asking the right questions," *Forced Migration Review*, Issue 31, October 2008: 42-43.

require *inter alia* more effective vulnerability analysis and mapping and early warning systems, contingency planning, and other preparedness measures. It will also require reinforcement of coordination and partnerships between governments and international systems. Innovations will be needed to secure the additional resources required and to account for these extra resources.¹⁵

Beyond these technical policy adjustments, however, is the need for a broader and deeper adjustment in the nature of humanitarian policy engagement and response to the human mobility, displacement and other trends associated with climate change. Many key normative, institutional, operational and resource structures and systems within the international humanitarian system are poorly equipped for addressing the multiple and complex challenges to human security posed by climate change, and continue to undermine the system's global capacities. For example:

- Distortions in the relative levels of donor assistance flowing to different countries due to competing political and strategic considerations means that, at the global level, the humanitarian system is already failing to respond adequately to many displaced and other vulnerable populations on the basis of humanitarian needs; recent reforms and initiatives designed to strengthen the needs responsiveness of the system, such as internationally pooled donor funding and common agreement of principles to underpin humanitarian donor policies have only achieved partial improvements in this respect.
- The humanitarian system remains relatively weak in strengthening and supporting civilian protection alongside material assistance, despite the higher visibility given to IDP protection over the past decade.
- Humanitarian programming for displaced populations is highly concentrated on material relief within camp settings, with urban programming capacities remaining particularly underdeveloped.
- Humanitarian funding and operations continue to marginalize longer-term or broader-based livelihoods

and recovery programming among displaced populations, including in mass return programs.

- International humanitarian actors' coordination and cooperation with government and other national actors is typically very weak, despite rhetorical recognition that local and national actors should play a primary or leading role in humanitarian action.¹⁶

More generally, humanitarian assistance that is designed and intended as a short-term instrument for meeting acute needs has often come to represent an inadequate long-term instrument for meeting chronic needs.¹⁷ Although agencies have often succeeded in delivering a range of basic services in these situations, this assistance has typically done little to bring about sustainable improvements in humanitarian indicators or any significant changes in the underlying conditions causing vulnerability.

The longer-term engagement of development actors is often hampered by continuing instability or conflict, or weak or illegitimate state institutions. More joined-up and effective engagement of humanitarian and development donors is also negatively affected by tightly defined and risk-averse systems of funding and engagement. The preference for food aid, for example, appears to be determined often by pre-existing earmarking and a preference for the "safe option," with its well understood mechanisms and expected short-term results.¹⁸

Although disaster risk reduction (DRR) activities are largely supported through humanitarian rather than development funding and institutions, these remain generally marginalized within the humanitarian system. This is reflected in the poor coverage, efficacy and sustainability of much prevention-oriented programming. There is a growing debate among humanitarian donors on how to better mainstream DRR within humanitarian and development assistance frameworks. Key challenges include the need for stronger political commitment to disaster preparedness and risk reduction; more explicit links between DRR and development effectiveness; stronger support for building local resilience through broad-based livelihoods and rights-based participatory approaches; and

¹⁵ Informal Task Force of the IASC et al., *op cit*.

¹⁶ Paul Harvey, *op cit*.

¹⁷ Paul Harvey, Rebecca Holmes, Rachel Slater and Ellen Martin, "Social protection in fragile states," Overseas Development Institute (London), November 2007: 5.

¹⁸ Pantuliano and Wekesa, *op cit*.

funding cycles that are more sensitive to the realities and complexities of delivering DRR and humanitarian assistance in difficult and turbulent environments. But uncertainty and inconsistency in policy priorities seem set to continue. These are aggravated by limitations of funding, capacity and overall leverage among key international actors, and by the complexity, scale and scope of the transitions and transformations needed in many countries that are most vulnerable to the negative human impacts of climate change.

An increasing recognition in development circles of the need to address the welfare needs of populations in these difficult environments, and continuing preoccupation among humanitarian and development actors with bridging the relief-to-development “gap” reflect a long-standing concern with finding new and more effective mechanisms for international engagement in many fragile states.

Conclusion: the need to adapt the humanitarian system to climate change and associated migration

Many of the world’s poorest and most crisis-prone countries will be disproportionately affected by climate change owing to higher exposure to climate-related hazards such as droughts and floods, pre-existing human vulnerabilities and weak capacities for risk reduction measures.¹⁹ As formal frameworks of state-led climate change adaptation are unlikely to have much traction here, pressure will continue to mount on the international humanitarian system to help to prevent disasters, reduce vulnerability and respond to humanitarian crises in these contexts.

Humanitarian preparedness and response should therefore represent a potentially significant component of the climate change adaptation agenda, and the latter should sit center-stage in the future evolution of international humanitarian policy. However, the mutual importance of humanitarian action and climate change adaptation has, to date, received comparatively scant attention in both policy arenas: the former is generally preoccupied with reacting to immediate humanitarian needs rather than anticipating possible future vulnerability dynamics and trends, while the latter is dominated by national adaptation plans which incorporate little directly in the way of humanitarian response or contingency planning.

Big questions and doubts will continue to surround the basic capacities of the international humanitarian system to respond sufficiently and effectively to the escalating humanitarian impacts of climate change in the many countries where national response systems are weak or non-existent. Many of these countries lack strategic importance in the global political economy and often fail to attract adequate donor funding to support effective humanitarian and social protection efforts. Frequently, weak or contested state legitimacy, high levels of violence, militarization and insecurity and poor civilian protection make these contexts hazardous and difficult environments for humanitarian agencies, severely compromising humanitarian access. Some of the world’s most vulnerable populations are beyond the effective reach of the international humanitarian system.

In the absence of comprehensive corrective and preventive action in these contexts, the prospect for some of the world’s poorest and most crisis-prone countries is a spiral of resource and livelihood insecurity, social and political tension and conflict, unchecked urbanization, chronic poverty and complex and large-scale migration and displacement. Where social safety nets cannot or will not be provided by the state or by international humanitarian actors, displacement will be unavoidable, and migration will continue to represent a primary coping or survival strategy, sometimes helping to ameliorate, but often serving to aggravate the negative impacts of climate change. Even under the best-case scenarios for successful implementation of disaster risk reduction, global humanitarian needs are set to escalate substantially as a consequence of climate change. The sheer scale and complexities of human mobility and displacement, and additional problems associated with climate change in these environments will continue to stretch and challenge the legal, institutional and operational frameworks and capacities of both national and international humanitarian actors.

Sarah Collinson is a Research Fellow and Program Leader of the Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute.

The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) is Britain’s leading independent think tank on international development and humanitarian issues.

PHOTO CREDIT: Floods in Ifo refugee camp, Dadaab, Kenya, UNHCR: B. Bannon, December 2006.

¹⁹ Informal Taskforce of the IASC et al., *op cit.*

Key messages for policymakers:

1. Efforts to improve humanitarian vulnerability analysis and strengthen the future needs responsiveness of the international humanitarian system should include explicit recognition that migration can be either a cause of risk and vulnerability to climate-related threats and hazards, or a key strategy in people's efforts to manage risk and reduce their own vulnerability. The significance of migration in exacerbating or ameliorating vulnerability will be highly variable among different people and groups, and may change as people's circumstances change. Policymakers need to recognize that no direct relationship exists between particular climate-related trends and migration. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize the central role that migration can play in vulnerable communities' efforts to protect livelihoods and adapt to the impacts of climate change. It is likely that a lack of state-supported social protection and high levels of livelihood insecurity are often associated with relatively high levels of "distress" migration.
2. Policymakers in humanitarian and related sectors should recognize and plan for the concurrent growth in both global humanitarian caseloads and in levels and complexity of both forced and voluntary migration due to increased human vulnerability and wider transformations linked with climate change. Donor governments should be prepared for a substantial increase in global demand for humanitarian funding to meet escalating humanitarian needs, but they should not expect any increase in humanitarian funding to have a predictable impact on migration dynamics. In some cases, increasing levels of mobility and migration may signify positive coping and adaptation of vulnerable populations to the complex threats and hazards associated with climate change.
3. Greater priority needs to be given to flexible humanitarian funding and programming suited to addressing chronic as well as acute humanitarian needs and vulnerability in countries with fragile state institutions where formal climate change adaptation policies are unlikely to be developed. Addressing widespread and growing needs and displacement dynamics in many crisis-prone countries most at risk from hazards associated with climate change will demand a strengthening of humanitarian programming in urban areas, and strengthened systems for disaster response in hostile and difficult political and security environments where close cooperation with the state may not be possible.
4. Policymakers should recognize that distinctions between "voluntary" and "involuntary" migration in many crisis-affected contexts may be arbitrary or difficult to apply in practice; responses to both forced and voluntary migration in these contexts should be based not on predefined categories, but on people's basic humanitarian and other needs.
5. Superficial climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction efforts in countries affected by complex and interacting processes including population growth, economic stagnation, conflict, urbanization and environmental stress, are unlikely to influence the deeper dynamics of vulnerability associated with distress migration that is caused or affected by climate change.

Study team members

Susan Martin, Institute for the Study of International Migration, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC (Co-Chair)

Koko Warner, Institute for Environment and Human Security, United Nations University, Bonn, Germany (Co-Chair)

Jared Banks and Suzanne Sheldon, Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC

Regina Bauerochse Barbosa, Economy and Employment Department, Sector Project Migration and Development, German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Eschborn, Germany

Alexander Carius, Moira Feil, and Dennis Tänzler, Adelphi Research, Berlin, Germany

Joel Charny, Refugees International, Washington, DC

Dimitria Clayton, Ministry for Intergenerational Affairs, Family, Women and Integration, State of North Rhine-Westphalia, Düsseldorf, Germany

Sarah Collinson, Overseas Development Institute, London, United Kingdom

Peter Croll, Ruth Vollmer, Andrea Warnecke, Bonn International Center for Conversion, Bonn, Germany

Frank Laczko, International Organization for Migration, Geneva, Switzerland

Agustin Escobar Latapi, Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social (CIESAS), Guadalajara, Mexico

Michelle Leighton, Center for Law and Global Justice, University of San Francisco, San Francisco, California and Munich Re Foundation-UNU Chair in Social Vulnerability

Philip Martin, University of California, Migration Dialogue, Davis, California

Heather McGray, World Resources Institute, Washington, DC

Lorenz Petersen, Climate Change Taskforce, German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Eschborn, Germany

Aly Tandian, Groupe d'Etudes et de Recherches sur les Migrations (GERMS), Gaston Berger University, Senegal

Agnieszka Weinar, Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security, European Commission, Brussels, Belgium

Astrid Ziebarth, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Berlin, Germany.

List of papers

Developing Adequate Humanitarian Responses
by Sarah Collinson

Migration, the Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence
by Frank Laczko

Climate Change and Migration: Key Issues for Legal Protection of Migrants and Displaced Persons
by Michelle Leighton

Climate Change, Agricultural Development, and Migration
by Philip Martin

Climate Change and International Migration
by Susan F. Martin

Climate Change, Migration and Adaptation
by Susan F. Martin

Climate Change, Migration and Conflict: Receiving Communities under Pressure?
by Andrea Warnecke, Dennis Tänzler and Ruth Vollmer

Assessing Institutional and Governance Needs Related to Environmental Change and Human Migration
by Koko Warner



Transatlantic Study Teams

The GMF Immigration and Integration Program's Transatlantic Study Teams link the transatlantic debate on international migration flows with its consequences for sending and receiving regions. Through compiling existing data, policy analysis, and dialogue with policymakers, selected study teams gather facts, convene leading opinion leaders on both sides of the Atlantic, promote open dialogue, and help to advance the policy debate. Study teams are chosen by a competitive selection process, based on the overall quality of their proposal, its policy relevance, institutional strength, sustainability, and potential for synergies. The Transatlantic Study Team 2009/2010 is investigating the impact of climate change on migration patterns. Environmental deterioration, including natural disasters, rising sea level, and drought problems in agricultural production, could cause millions of people to leave their homes in the coming decades. Led by Dr. Susan F. Martin, Georgetown University, and Dr. Koko Warner, UN University, the team consists of scholars, policymakers and practitioners from the migration and environmental communities.

The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a non-partisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting better understanding and cooperation between North America and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.

The Institute for the Study of International Migration is based in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Staffed by leading experts on immigration and refugee policy, the Institute draws upon the resources of Georgetown University faculty working on international migration and related issues on the main campus and in the law center. It conducts research and convenes workshops and conferences on immigration and refugee law and policies. In addition, the Institute seeks to stimulate more objective and well-documented migration research by convening research symposia and publishing an academic journal that provides an opportunity for the sharing of research in progress as well as finished projects.

The UN University established by the UN General Assembly in 1973, is an international community of scholars engaged in research, advanced training and the dissemination of knowledge related to pressing global problems. Activities focus mainly on peace and conflict resolution, sustainable development and the use of science and technology to advance human welfare. The University's Institute for Environment and Human Security addresses risks and vulnerabilities that are the consequence of complex environmental hazards, including climate change, which may affect sustainable development. It aims to improve the in-depth understanding of the cause effect relationships to find possible ways to reduce risks and vulnerabilities. The Institute is conceived to support policy and decision makers with authoritative research and information.