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


The Center for International Sustainable Development Law
& The International Development Law Organization

present:

International Law and Climate Migrants

Benoît Mayer



INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CLIMATE MIGRANTS

Benoît Mayer¹

1. Introduction

1.1. Definition

The IOM defines environmental migrants as “persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.”² Yet, ongoing debates are related to the inclusion of *internally* or *temporarily* displaced persons. Another definitional issue concerns the degree of causal link between climate change and individual decisions to migrate, in particular in the frequent case where environmental factors coincide with economic, social or political ones. Dun and Gemenne noted that the refugee convention does not require that persecution be the sole, nor even the main reason for displacement of political refugees, but it solely requires that there *be* persecution.³

1.2. Scope of Climate Migrations

Climate migration is a fast-growing phenomenon. The author does not know about any existing statistics on the current scope of climate migration, but many sources witness this ongoing phenomenon.⁴ For 2050, two estimations are often referred to:

- Myers: 200 million climate migrants⁵

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² *Discussion Note: Migration and the Environment* (IOM, 2007), Document MC/INF/288, online: < http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/about_iom/en/council/94/MC_INF_288.pdf > at para. 6 and 7. See also: “Migration, Climate Change and Environmental Degradation: Definitional Issues”, IOM website: < <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/activities/by-theme/migration-climate-change-environmental-degradation/definitional-issues> >.

³ Olivia Dun & François Gemenne, “Defining ‘environmental migration’” (2008) 31 *Forced Migrations Rev.* 10, online: *Forced Migrations* < <http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR31/FMR31.pdf> > at 10.

⁴ See e.g.: United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on Climate change and its possible security implications*, 11 September 2009, UN document A/64/350; Displacement Solutions. *The Bougainville Resettlement Initiative* (Canberra, 2008), online: *Displacement Solutions* < <http://displacementsolutions.org/files/documents/BougainvilleResettlementInitiative-MeetingReport.pdf> >; Warner, Koko *et.al.* *In Search of Shelter: Mapping the Effects of Climate Change on Human Migration and Displacement* (CARE International and Columbia University, 2009), online: *Care International* < http://www.care.org/getinvolved/advocacy/migration_report.asp >.

⁵ Norman Myers, “Environmental Refugees: An Emergent Security Issue” (Paper presented to the 13th OSCE Economic Forum, Prague, 23 May 2005), online: *OSCE* < http://www.osce.org/documents/eea/2005/05/14488_en.pdf >.

- UN Secretary-General: “between 50 million and 350 million.”⁶

Most of climate migrants will be internally displaced. Yet, climate change will forcibly lead to international migrations under certain circumstances, in particular in Small Island or densely populated developing States.

2. International Rules Governing Climate Change Migrations

2.1. Refugee Law: Inapplicability and Exceptions

The definition of “political refugees” was adopted *so as to exclude environmental migrants* from the Convention’s scope, as “[its] drafters recognized natural calamities as major causes of human migrations and purposefully declined to extend refugee status to the victims of such events.”⁷ The condition of a “well founded fear of being persecuted,”⁸ relating to an action or inaction of a government, can usually not be invoked by climate migrants. Thus, the rule is that climate migrants do not fall within the scope of the *Refugee Convention* – and cannot properly be called “refugees.” Yet, there are two exceptions to this rule.

- Finland and Sweden have adopted domestic legal provisions granting subsidiary protection to anyone who, “by reason of an environmental catastrophe, cannot return to his home country.”⁹
- Climate migrants persecuted by their government, for instance through a policy hostile to internal displacements, could naturally be recognized as political refugees.

2.2. Protection of Internally-Displaced Climate Migrants

There is no definition of IDPs in international treaty law, but only in soft-law documents. The two main instruments include environmental and climate migrants.

- The *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*¹⁰ apply to any person or group of persons “who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or **natural or human-made disasters**, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.”¹¹ This instrument contains numerous

⁶ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on Climate change and its possible security implications*, 11 September 2009, UN document A/64/350, online: Islands First < http://www.islandsfirst.org/updates/sgreport_cc_security.pdf > at para. 54.

⁷ Jeanhee Hong, “Refugees of the 21st Century: Environmental Injustice” (2001) 10 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 323, online: < <http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/JLPP/upload/Hong-323.pdf> > at 332.

⁸ *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees*, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 19 U.S.T. 6259, online: < <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3be01b964.html> > art. 1 (A) 2 and *Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 30 January 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, online: < <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/v2prsr.htm> > art.1.2.

⁹ *Swedish 2005 Aliens Act*, SFS 2005:716, Chapter 4, sect. 2, para. 3, online: Swedish Government (official translation in English) < <http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/06/61/22/bfb61014.pdf> >. See also: *Finish Aliens Act*, 301/2004, Sect. 88a(1), online: Finish Ministry of the Interior (unofficial translation) < <http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2004/en20040301.pdf> >.

¹⁰ *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, Commission on Human Rights, 54th Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (1998), online: UNHCR < <http://www.unhcr.org/43ce1cff2.html> >.

¹¹ *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, Commission on Human Rights, 54th Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (1998), online: UNHCR < <http://www.unhcr.org/43ce1cff2.html> >, Scope and purpose, para. 2. On the application of the guiding principles by States, see: Phil Orchard, “Protection of Internally Displaced Persons: Soft Law as a Norm-Generating Mechanism” (2010) 36 Rev. Int’l Studies 281.

provisions to protect IDPs' Human Rights, amongst others the right to "receive protection and humanitarian assistance."

- The *Declaration of International Law Principles on Internally Displaced Persons*, adopted by the International Law Association, applies to "persons internally displaced by whatever causes, such as natural or man-made disasters or large-scale developmental projects, whenever the responsible State or de facto authority fails, for reasons that violate fundamental human rights, to protect and assist those victims."¹²

The UNHCR is the only international institution in charge of internally displaced persons. Yet, the UNHCR has adopted its own definition, different from the *Guiding Principles* and the ILA's *Declaration*. It defines IDPs as people who would be political refugees if they had reached an international border.¹³ Thus, the UNHCR excludes most climate migrants from any international institutional protection.

2.3. Statelessness Law: Open Questions and an Insufficient Answer

Statelessness could be invoked in the case of low lying Small Islands, such as Tuvalu and the Maldives, hugely affected by the rise of the sea level. It would require that a State's territory, population or government disappeared. Yet, a low lying island's territory would become uninhabitable (or dangerous to live on) much before being totally submerged. Therefore, the first "missing" element of statehood would probably be a population residing on the State's territory.¹⁴

But the protection of the current statelessness regime would in any case not be sufficient. The *Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons*, ratified by only 65 States,¹⁵ prohibits expulsion of stateless persons *lawfully staying on the territory*, except on ground of national security or public order.¹⁶ In contrast, the *Refugee Convention* prohibits penalties to refugees for illegal entry or presence. In no case, being "stateless" would allow a right to migrate and find asylum in a third country. Actually, as long as climate "victims" have not migrated and stay on their territory, they would not be stateless, as their territory would still be inhabited. As for the 1961 *Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness*, it mainly claims that it

¹² *Declaration of International Law Principles on Internally Displaced Persons*, International Law Association, 29 July 2000, online: UNHCR < <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/42808e5b4.html> > art. 1 para. 2.

¹³ See: David Keane, "Environmental Causes and Consequences of Migration: A Search for the Meaning of Environmental Refugees" (2003) 16 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 217 at 217; "Internally Displaced People", UNHCR website, online: < <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c146.html> > ("Even if they have fled for similar reasons as refugees [...], IDPs legally remain under the protection of their own government").

¹⁴ In this sense, see: Jane McAdam, "Disappearing States', Statelessness and the Boundaries of International Law" (2010) University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series No. 2, online: SSRN < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1539766 > at 6ff. See also: UNHCR, "Climate Change and Statelessness: an Overview", submission to the 6th session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA 6) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 1 to 12 June 2009, Bonn, Germany, online: < <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/smsn/igo/048.pdf> > at 2.

¹⁵ UN Treaty Database, online: < <http://treaties.un.org> >, as of 6 July 2010.

¹⁶ *Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons*, 28 September 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117, online: < <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/stateless.htm> > art. 31.

is “desirable to reduce statelessness by international agreement.”¹⁷ Yet, this alone does not create any enforceable right to a nationality.

2.4. International Migration Law’s Inexistence

Several existing instruments on international migrations merely recall migrants’ equal right to enjoy their non-political Human Rights like nationals. The main international migration legal documents are:

1. *International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families*,¹⁸
2. UN General Assembly’s *Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live*,¹⁹
3. Several ILO conventions.²⁰

Yet, because they content to recall the application of Human Rights, these instruments fail to provide climate migrants with any specific assistance. The worse for climate migrants would actually be their assimilation with “voluntary” “economic” migrants – those which States can accept or reject depending mainly on their economic productivity.

3. A Human Rights Analysis of Climate Migrations

3.1. Human Rights in the Course of Climate Migration

3.1.1. Human Rights of Potential Climate Migrants in their Place of Origin

Climate migrations can be caused by three scenarios:

1. **Low-lying Small Islands developing States**, threatened by sea level rise. Example: The Maldives, Tuvalu.
2. **Low-lying coastal areas**, in particular deltas. Example: Bangladesh, Vietnam, Egypt, Nigeria.

¹⁷ *Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness*, 30 August 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175, online: UNHCR < <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b39620.html> >, preamble recital 2. See also art. 15 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.

¹⁸ *International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families*, 18 December 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 93, 30 ILM 1517, entered into force 1 July 2003, online: Office of the UNHCR < <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cmw.htm> > (article 2 defines a migrant worker as “a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national” but it provides some exceptions, in particular for frontier and seasonal workers).

¹⁹ *Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live*, GA Res. 40/144, UN GAOR, 40th Sess., UN Doc. A/RES/40/144 (1985), online: < <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f00864.html> > (art. 2 para. 1 clearly provides that “[n]othing in this Declaration shall be interpreted as legitimizing the illegal entry into and presence in a State of any alien, nor shall any provision be interpreted as restricting the right of any State to promulgate laws and regulations concerning the entry of aliens and the terms and conditions of their stay or to establish differences between nationals and aliens”).

²⁰ C97 *Migration for Employment Convention* (Revised), 1 July 1949, 120 U.N.T.S. 70, online: University of Minnesota < <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/migrationemployment.html> > (art. 11 defines a “migrant for employment” as “a person who migrates from one country to another with a view to being employed otherwise than on his own account and includes any person regularly admitted as a migrant for employment”, thus excluding undocumented migrants); C143 *Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention*, 24 June 1975, 1120 UNTS 77, online: ILO < <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C143> > (art. 11 adopts a definition of migrant workers similar to that of the migrant for employment).

3. Desertification and land degradation, in particular in African Sahel. Example: Niger, Nigeria.

More violent and more frequent climate hazard will further threaten affected populations.

The following Human Rights of potential climate migrants may be affected in their place of origin:

- First generation rights:
 - o Right to life,
 - o Freedom from inhuman or degrading treatments.
- Second generation rights:
 - o Right to an adequate standard of living,
 - o Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.
- Third generation rights (mainly in non-binding international instruments):
 - o Right to a healthy environment,
 - o Right to natural resources,
 - o Right to social and economic development.

These rights could be opposed to the State of origin, which must take necessary actions to guarantee its populations rights. However, the State of origin may simply be unable to respond to certain changes of climate conditions.

3.1.2. Human Rights of Candidates to Climate Migrations during their Attempted Migration

In addition to affected rights in the place of origin, restrictions to internal displacements of affected populations may constitute violations of the “right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.”²¹

3.1.3. Rights Issues in the Place of Destination

Climate migrants may suffer from further violations of their fundamental rights once they have arrived at their place of destination.

- First generation rights:
 - o Freedom from discriminations,
 - o Right to family life (family reunification),
 - o Arguably, the right to some form of political participation and incorporation, such as the right to a nationality.
- Second generation rights:
 - o Cultural rights,²²
 - o Freedom from discriminations,
 - o Equal rights to social assistance – considering climate migrants’ specific needs.
- Third generation rights (mainly in non-binding international instruments):
 - o Collective rights, such as the right to self-determination, but also the right to economic development.

²¹ *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Art. 12.1.

²² *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*, 16 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 368, art. 27: “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.”

Climate migrants' collective and cultural rights are particularly at stake.²³ Adapting a foreign population in a completely different social environment is a social and political challenge.

In the case of highly populated countries greatly affected by climate change (e.g.: Bangladesh),²⁴ internal climate migrations and a strict control of international borders by neighbouring countries would lead to highly acceptable density of population in the remaining territory. Beyond some threshold, depending on the level of development, human density necessarily lead to grave violations of the most basic human rights.

3.2. Corollary States Obligations

3.2.1. States' Obligation to Protect their Population and Failure as the "Raison d'être" of Climate Migrations

Climate migrations follow situations where climate migrants' rights are violated, because their State of origin is either unable or unwilling to protect these rights. The State of origin's obligation mainly consists in **adaptation *in situ***. However, even with substantial international support, there are some circumstances under which adaptation *in situ* is not a solution, as it would be too costly or too dangerous: dikes can break.²⁵ Under such circumstances, one must fully understand that "[m]igration [...] is a coping mechanism used throughout history by societies as part of their resource utilization strategies and as a means of coping with climate variability."²⁶ Therefore, wherever a State is unable to guarantee successful adaptation *in situ*, it must organize internal displacements with respect for climate migrants Human Rights. However, a State could be unable to organize a sustainable resettlement if a substantial part of their territory is affected. In other words, **"adaptation" should include not only "adaption *in situ*," but also, under certain circumstances, displacement.**

3.2.2. Potential Destination States' Obligation not to turn back Migrants to Inhuman or Degrading Treatment

States do not have the obligation to protect a population which is not under their jurisdiction (control). However, once a migrant has entered their territory, even in case of illegal entrance, States have to protect their Human Rights. In particular, destination States must not expel climate migrants to a country where they would be exposed to the danger of inhuman or degrading treatment²⁷ or where their right to life may be affected.

²³ Tuvalu's Prime Minister expressed his fear that "[r]esettlement would destroy the very fabric of our nationhood and culture." In Apisai Ielemia, "A Threat To Our Human Rights: Tuvalu's Perspective On Climate Change" (2007) 44 UN Chronicle 18.

²⁴ With 150 million inhabitants, Bangladesh in the 9th most populated country and the 8th most densely populated.

²⁵ See e.g. Oli Brown, *Migration and Climate Change* (Geneva: IOM, 2008) at 38.

²⁶ W.N. Adger *et al.*, "Adaptation to climate change in the developing world" (2003) 3 Progress in Development Studies 179 at 189.

²⁷ Cf. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. res. 39/46, [annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984)], entered into force June 26, 1987, art. 3. See generally: Wouters, C. W. *International Legal Standards for the Protection from Refoulement: A Legal Analysis on the Prohibitions on Refoulement Contained in the Refugee Convention, the European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention Against Torture* (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2009).

3.2.3. International Community's International Responsibility to Protect?

Arguably, the responsibility to protect, primary recognized in the case of “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,”²⁸ could be invoked as a legal basis for third States “soft obligation” to intervene when a State is unable or unwilling to protect its population’s Human Rights. Such obligation could include funding, but also intervening “in a timely and decisive manner.”²⁹ Alternatively, the international responsibility to protect could be a political argument rather than a legal one.

4. International Financial Support for Climate Migrants

4.1. Framework on Climate Change’s Focus on “Adaptation” rather than Displacement

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) provides that “[t]he developed country Parties [...] shall [...] assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects.”³⁰ This provision, recalled in the Kyoto Protocol,³¹ indicates neither what is to be funded, nor what adaptation shall mean. Arguably, displacement can be considered as a strategy of adaptation to environmental change. The two main financial actors in climate change adaptation have constantly privileged “adaptation” (Global Environmental Facility, GEF) and “climate resilience” (World Bank). Up to now, these two institutions have considered that the notions of adaptation and climate resilience should be understood as excluding *displacement*.

4.2. Possibilities of Partial Funding by other Institutions

Potentially, funding for climate migrations could stem from three other spheres: humanitarian assistance, migration organizations and development aid (see table next page). Yet, none of these institutions does address the core of climate migration financial needs. In particular, extending the competence of the UNHCR would probably endanger refugees’ specific protection³² while eluding the specific needs of climate migrations (in particular regarding collective and cultural rights and the impossibility of a future return to the country of origin).

²⁸ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect*, 12 January 2009, UN Document A/63/677, online: Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect < <http://globalr2p.org/pdf/SGR2PEng.pdf> > para. 11(a).

²⁹ *Ibid.* para. 11(c).

³⁰ *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, 9 May 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 31 I.L.M. 848, entered into force on 21 March 1994, online: < http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/1349.php > art. 4.4.

³¹ Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, entered into force on 16 February 2005, art. 12.8

³² See: Kara K. Moberg, “Extending Refugee Definitions to Cover Environmentally Displaced Persons Displaces Necessary Protection” (2009) 94 Iowa L. Rev. 1107, online: < http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/issues/ILR_94-3_Moberg.pdf > at 22. See also above at 87.

IO	Fund	Purpose	Relation to Climate Migration
UNFCCC	SPA (GEF)	Concrete adaptation projects and NAPAs.	Could intervene if climate migration = adaptation strategy
	SCCF (GEF)	Adaptation projects in developing countries.	Could intervene if climate migration = adaptation strategy
	LDCF (GEF)	NAPAs in 48 LDCs.	Could intervene if climate migration = adaptation strategy
	AF	Finance all adaptation activities.	Could intervene if climate migration = adaptation strategy
WB	PPCR	Finance climate resilience in development (NAPA).	Could intervene if climate migration = adaptation strategy
OCHA	GHC	Humanitarian assistance and emergency disasters relief.	Responses to various vulnerabilities of climate migrants
	CERF	Humanitarian assistance after natural disasters and armed conflicts.	Responses to various vulnerabilities of climate migrants
	ERF	Country-based funds to provide flexible humanitarian finance.	Useful to address sudden onset event induced-migration
	CHF	Predictable humanitarian funding on a country level.	Useful to address slow onset event induced-migration
IASC	-	Network of humanitarian IOs / strengthen coordination of humanitarian assistance.	Example of inter-agencies architecture in a specific goal
UNHCR	-	Providing protection and assistance for refugees and forced migrants.	Could intervene if climate migration = forced migrants
IOM	-	Promote human and orderly migration / assistance to migrants.	Ongoing research and development of assistance for CM
UNDP	-	Sustainable development / poverty reduction / governance / crisis prevention and recovery.	Could intervene in prevention and recovering of climate migration
SFDCC (WBG)	-	Coordination of WBG bodies to address development challenges induced by climate change.	Example of inter-agency architecture in a specific goal

*Source: Siméon de Hey.*³³

4.3. A Promising Initiative at the Regional Level: the Asian Development Bank (ADB)

The ADB has funded research projects on “support to climate-induced migrations”³⁴ and is currently studying the “studying the possibility of creating a financial facility that will address climate change-induced migration among its developing member-countries.”³⁵

³³ Siméon de Hey, “Global Governance to Address Climate Migration,” presentation at Marseilles on June 15-16, 2010, <http://www.afd-chine.org/jahia/webdav/site/afd/users/administrateur/public/Portail%20Mediterranee/Migration-MENA/10-de-Hey.pdf>.

³⁴ ADB, “Policy Options to Support Climate-Induced Migration,” Project Number: 43181-01, Research and Development Technical Assistance (RTA), December 2009, online: <http://www.adb.org/Documents/TARs/REG/43181-REG-TAR.pdf>.

³⁵ Brian Thomas, “Asian Development Bank mulls new financing for climate-induced migration,” 5 April 2010, Blog *Carbon Based Climate Change Adaptation*, online: <http://carbon-based-ghg.blogspot.com/2010/04/asian-development-bank-mulls-new.html>.

5. Conclusion

There might be some possible financial and expertise sources for climate migrations in several existing institutions. Yet, *coordination by an explicitly dedicated agency* is missing. In addition, existing institutions would not have *sufficient financial capacities* for the very wide-spread needs of estimated 200 million climate migrants in the next four decades (compare with the current 16 million refugees). A medium-term objective could be to engage States in the drafting of an international convention on climate migrations, which would create an *ad hoc* organization and organize large funding. This should be done at a global level to allow efficient and fair burden sharing.

The mission of the Centre for International Sustainable Development Law (CISDL) is to promote sustainable societies and the protection of ecosystems by advancing the understanding, development and implementation of international sustainable development law.

The CISDL is an independent legal research centre which collaborates with the McGill Law Faculty in engaging students and interested faculty members in sustainable development law research and scholarly initiatives. The CISDL also works in cooperation with a network of developing country faculties of law, and is developing closer ties with the Cambridge University Faculty of Law, the Université de Montreal, Capetown University and the University of Costa Rica. It has guidance from the three Montreal-based multilateral treaty secretariats, the World Bank Legal Vice-Presidency, the United Nations Environment Programme and the United Nations Development Programme, and a memorandum of understanding with the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD).

With the International Law Association (ILA) and the International Development Law Organisation (IDLO), under the auspices of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (UN CSD), CISDL chairs a Partnership Initiative, International Law for Sustainable Development that was launched in Johannesburg at the 2002 World Summit for Sustainable Development, to build knowledge, analysis and capacity about international law on sustainable development.

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